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THE FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY ACT:
A CASE STUDY IN THE CREATION OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
JOSEPH C. LONGt

N 1962, Congress passed the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act.'
The Act was passed in response to a report of the Comptroller
General2 indicating that the federal government was spending large
sums annually for the treatment of military personnel, their dependents,
civilian employees, and other persons entitled to medical treatment at
government expense 3 for injuries suffered as a result of the tortious
conduct of a third party.4

The report concluded that in many cases

there was no statutory authority for recovery of these costs and that
no attempt was being made to recover them.' As a result of this hiatus
the tortfeasor or the injured party received a windfall at the Government's expense. 6
t

Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. A.B., Uni-

versity of Missouri, 1961, J.D., 1963; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1972. Member,
Missouri and Illinois Bars.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (1970).

2. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES CONCERNING RECOVERY OF THE COST OF HOSPITALIZATION AND
MEDICAL SERVICES IN NEGLIGENT THIRD PARTY CASES (1960) [hereinafter cited as
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT].

3. This category covers a wide and diverse group of people, ranging from

American seamen and Peace Corps volunteers to American Indians. For a comprehensive listing of those eligible for medical treatment at government expense, see 10

U.S.C. §§ 1071-87 (Supp. I, 1971) ; 38 U.S.C. § 610(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 24953(a) (1970).

4. The Comptroller General's report indicates that between January 1957 and

June 1959, the Department of Defense spent $10.5 million per year for the treatment
of military personnel (excluding dependents) for injuries received in accidents involving private vehicles. In 40 per cent of these accidents, resulting in care amounting
to $4.2 million, the military personnel were either passengers or pedestrians. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
5. There were two notable exceptions. Both the Veterans Administration and
the Bureau of Employees' Compensation, Department of Labor, had recovery programs of long standing. See text accompanying notes 31-36 infra.
6. Whether the tortfeasor or the injured party would receive the windfall de-

pended upon whether the injured party could recover medical costs which he had not
incurred. If the jurisdiction recognized the collateral source rule, then he could
recover; if not, then the windfall went to the tortfeasor. See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 516
(1966) (listing states recognizing the collateral source rule).

(353)
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The Recovery Act (the Act) as finally enacted' provides that the
federal government shall have the right to recover from tortfeasors the
8
cost of medical care furnished tort victims by it or at its expense,
if the third party is liable to respond in damages to the injured party.
Unfortunately, the statute is far from being all inclusive; it is poorly
drafted, and ambiguous in a number of respects.' ° As a result, the
courts have been left with the rather bewildering task of interpreting
the statute and creating "interstitial" federal common law to fill the

gaps left by the legislation. Clearly the federal courts, as a result of
7. Congress at the time also considered three other bills. H.R. 4815, S. 1019 &
H.R. 298, 87th Cong., lst Sess. (1961). The bill as originally introduced underwent
extensive modification by the House Committee on the Judiciary prior to its enactment. Both the House and the Senate published reports on the version of the bill as
finally passed. See H.R. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. REP. No.
1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Both reports appended comments of the various
agencies affected by the legislation. However, these comments must be viewed with
great care since the majority of them were based upon the original draft bill before
it was amended to give the Government an independent right of recovery as well as
the subrogated right provided in the original bill.
8. One of the major unanswered questions under the Recovery Act is its application to payments made under the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (1970),
where the Government is forced to pay for care to a medicare recipient and injury
was the result of a tortious act of a third party. The scant authority available
seems to answer in the negative. The General Counsel, Bureau of Health Insurance,
Social Security Administration, has often taken this position. See, e.g., Op. Gen. Coun.,
Bur. of Health Insurance Jan. 16, 1968, cited in The Defense Research Institute, Inc.,
Subrogation Rights Under Medicare, 11 FOR THE DEFENSE 44 (1970). The General
Counsel bases his conclusion on an interpretation that the Recovery Act applies only
where the Government furnishes the care, not where it simply pays for it. This
position was also adopted in the only reported case to consider the issue. Our Lady
of Mercy Hosp. v. McIntosh, 461 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. 1970). In Mcintosh, the
court allowed the injured recipient to recover his medical costs under the collateral
source rule over the defendant's objection that the Government, not the plaintiff, had
a right to recover these costs under the Recovery Act. Cf. Imvris v. Michigan
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App. 406, 198 N.W.2d 36 (1972).
The language of the Recovery Act does read in terms of furnishing care, yet
it is questionable whether its application ought to be limited to those cases where care
is physically furnished in a government hospital. While to the author's knowledge
this question has never been litigated, it is clear that the Government has recovered
in many cases where the treatment has been rendered to military personnel and dependents by civilian institutions, and the Government has paid the bills. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Likewise, it would
seem that the Government should be able to recover where the military member pays
for the care initially, and the Government reimburses him and then seeks to recover
its costs. Cf. American Indem. Co. v. Olesijuk, 353 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) ;
Smith v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 672, 190 N.W.2d 873 (1971). It is
submitted that it should not matter whether the obligation on behalf of the Government to pay for the care arises under the Military and Dependents Medical Care Act, 10
U.S.C. §§ 1071-87 (Supp. 1, 1971), or the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq.
(1970), and that the word "furnished" in the Recovery Act should be interpreted to
cover all situations where the United States bears the financial burden of paying for
the care.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1970).
10. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489,
532-34 (1954), argues that such poor drafting of legislation is another reason why
Congress should not be given the responsibility of making this type of law in the
first place. He persuasively argues that the nuts and bolts type of tort law should
be developed under federal common law, without the need for enabling powers
from Congress.
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the Lincoln Mills doctrine," have the power to create this body of
law, and the Act represents a prime example of - to paraphrase
Judge Friendly - Congress transferring part of its !oad to the federal
2
judges.1
The first reported case under the Act was decided in 1965." a
Since that time some fifty other cases have been decided. Because of
the poor draftsmanship, the meager guidelines articulated and the
manageable number of actions brought pursuant to the Act, this area
affords an ideal vehicle for the study of the process surrounding the
creation of federal common law. First, this Article will examine the
general rules established by the Supreme Court governing the creation
of federal common law or federal rules of decision. Next, it will
attempt to establish the congressional intent behind the passage of the
Recovery Act. Since the Act was not passed in a vacuum, but was
enacted against a background of earlier attempts at governmental recovery, this Article will also briefly present this history and then will
examine in detail the cases decided under the Act to ascertain how
the courts have fared in their task of interpreting the Act and creating
"interstitial" federal common law. Since some of the decisions are
inconsistent and contradictory, the Article will suggest areas where the
present decisions are not responsive to either the guidelines for federal
rules of decision laid down by the Supreme Court, or to the congressional policy behind the Recovery Act. Finally, the Article will present
a series of internally consistent rules which, hopefully, are in harmony
with the congressional purpose and the guidelines of the Supreme Court.
The starting point for this study would seem to bc to relate briefly
the history of governmental recovery and the rules governing the
creation of federal common law.
I.

HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL

RECOVERY

Recovery of medical costs for treatment of injured government
workers is not unique to the federal government. It has been a source
of concern and litigation by governmental units, both national and
local, world-wide, since before 1920.'4 A study of these various attempts
11. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), stands
for the proposition that federal courts can create federal common law only in those
areas where Congress has authorized it. For a full discussion of the doctrine, see
Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383 (1964).
12. Friendly, supra note 11, at 419.
13. United States v. Ammons, 242 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
14. The first case, in 1916, involved an attempt to recover the costs of death
benefits paid to a serviceman's survivors. Admiralty Comm'rs v. The S.S. Amerika,
[1917] A.C. 38 (1916). This was followed by Bradford Corp. v. Webster, [1920]
2 K.B. 135, involving recovery for loss of the services of an injured policeman.
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reveals that there are four separate theories which have been used to
justify governmental recovery. Three of the theories - assignment, 5
unjust enrichment or quasi-contract, 6 and equitable subrogation 7 are derivative actions based in equity. The fourth, action per quod
servitium antisit,5 is a direct action based in law.
Two problems have generally faced governmental units in their
attempts to take advantage of any of the derivative rights of recovery.
First, the law has been loathe to grant recovery to a volunteer, regardless of how meritorious his position might be.' 9 This, however, should
pose no great problem to recovery by the federal government since it
does not provide medical care except where required to do so by
statute. Therefore, the Government should not be treated as a volunteer,
but as one acting under statutory compulsion.20
15. This approach was used in the Veterans' Administration program. See text
accompanying notes 34-36 infra. For a discussion of the German approach, see W.
MARSCHALL, REFLEXCHADEN AND REGREBRECHTE (1967);
Fleming, The Collateral
Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966) ; Mann,
The Problem of Policeman's Pay - The German Approach, 20 MOD. L. REV. 290
(1957). See generally Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler,

74

HARV.

L.

REV.

817 (1961).

16. See Receiver for the Metro. Police Dist. v. Tatum, [1948] 2 K.B. 68;
Receiver for the Metro. Police Dist. v. Croydon Corp., [1956] 1 W.L.R. 1113 (Q.B.),
rcv'd, [1957] 2 Q.B. 154 (C.A.). But see Monmouthshire County Council v. Smith,
[1956] 1 W.L.R. 1132. See also City of Jackson v. Little, 248 So. 2d 795 (Miss.
1971), wherein the question of unjust enrichment was raised, but the case was decided
on other grounds.
17. Wood v. Ford Garage, Inc., 162 Misc. 87, 293 N.Y.S. 999 (Sup. Ct.) (dicta),
aft'd, 252 App. Div. 921, 300 N.Y.S. 1358 (1937) ; Philadelphia v. Rapid Transit Co.,
337 Pa. 1, 10 A.2d 434 (1940). The Pennsylvania position has been affirmed in
Topelski v. Universal South Side Auto, Inc., 407 Pa. 339, 180 A.2d 414 (1962). See
Furia v. Philadelphia, 180 Pa. Super. 50, 118 A.2d 236 (1955). Equitable subrogation
has been denied by the courts in Alabama and Mississippi. See City of Birmingham
v. Jones, 267 Ala. 281, 101 So. 2d 263 (1958) ; City of Birmingham v. Trammell, 267
Ala. 245, 101 So. 2d 259 (1958) ; City of Birmingham v. Crow, 267 Ala. 243, 101 So.
2d 264 (1958) ; City of Birmingham v. Tate, 267 Ala. 216, 101 So. 2d 263 (1958) ;
City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 101 So. 2d 250 (1958); and City of
Jackson v. Little, 248 So. 2d 795 (Miss. 1971). Statutory subrogation has been
included in a number of federal statutes. See notes 96-107 and accompanying text
infra. Statutory subrogation has also been enacted in Israel (see Shalgi, A Benefactor's Right of Action Against a Tortfeasor: A New Approach in Israel, 29 MOD.
L. REV. 42 (1966)) and suggested in England. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH
REPORT, CMD. No. 2017 (1963).
18. The action per quod servitium amisit is an ancient cause of action having been
traced back to a case decided in 1293. Jones, Per Qnod Servitium Amisit, 74 LAw
Q. REV. 39, 40 n.6 (1958), citing Y.B. 21 Edw. I (Rolls Series, at 119) (1293). In
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663 (1923), the author attempts
to trace the beginning of the tort back to the right of the pater-familias to bring actio
iniuriarnm for violence or insult to members of his extended household under
Roman law.
19. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Continental Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Western Contracting Corp., 341 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Parramore v.
Williams, 215 Ga. 179, 182, 109 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1959). While this failure to
recognize the claim of the volunteer has been criticized as one of the greatest flaws
of all modern civilized legal systems (Shalgi, supra note 17, at 43), there appears
little chance that the courts will make any substantial change in this area. But see
Grosse, Moral Obligation as Consideration in Contracts, 17 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
20. Where the Government has the discretionary right to grant or withhold treatment, it would seem to be acting as a mere volunteer. See Loman v. Harrelson, 437
S.W.2d 123, 126-27 (Mo. App. 1968) ; City of Youngstown v. Cities Service Oil Co.,
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Secondly, since its rights are derivative, the government's right
of recovery stands or falls on the right of the injured party to recover
these costs from the tortfeasor initially. 2 ' This problem presents no
obstacle in jurisdictions where the courts recognize the collateral source
rule allowing a victim to recover such expenses.22 Unfortunately, in
those jurisdictions that do not recognize the collateral source rule, the
courts have taken a narrow legalistic position in regard to the injured
party's right to recover for the care furnished by the government.
In England, for example, the Court of Appeal, in Receiver for the
Metropolitan Police District v. Croydon Corp.,23 held that an injured
policeman had no obligation to pay for the care furnished by the
Receiver and therefore had not "incurred" any loss. 24 Since he had
suffered no loss, the court reasoned, he could not recover these costs
from the tortfeasor, as the tortfeasor's only obligation was to bear
the losses incurred by the injured party.
This reasoning has been characterized as being a "verbal" argument which should not prevent the courts from reaching the real merits
of the problem.2 5 While the argument may be logically sound, there
is no question that it leads to a wooden, artificial result. Clearly, a
very real monetary "loss" has been suffered in these cases. Whether
suffered by the injured party or someone acting on his behalf, is
irrelevant.2 6
The fourth theory, per quod servitium amisit, avoids these problems and attacks the question of recovery directly. Instead of allowing
a right of recovery which derives from the injured party, it recognizes
60 Ohio App. 97, 100, 31 N.E.2d 876, 879 (1940) ; City of Richmond v. Hanes, 203
Va. 102, 108, 122 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1961).
21. Thus the right of recovery would be affected by the contributory negligence
of, or assumption of risk by, the injured party, as well as by any immunity between
the tortfeasor and the injured party, such as host-guest, interspousal, or parent-child.
See notes 143-95 and accompanying text infra.
22. See Annot., supra note 6. In a number of cases decided prior to the Recovery
Act, the injured servicemember or veteran had been allowed to recover for care
furnished by the Government. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); Gillis v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 331, 338 (D.N.D. 1960).

23. [1957] 2 Q.B. 154 (C.A.).

24. Id. at 163-64. This problem of "incurring" a loss often arises in the context of
whether a health and accident insured can recover under the terms of his policy. See
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Coke, 254 Miss. 936, 939, 183 So. 2d 490, 493 (1966) ; Graham
v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 115, 119-20, 161 S.E.2d 485, 490 (1968). For a
discussion of this problem as it bears on the Government's right to recover under the
insurance contract, see Long, Recovery Beyond the Federal Medical Care Recovery
Act, 14 S.D.L. REv. 20 (1969).
25. Parsons, Damages in Actions for Personal Injuries: The Problem of Converging Loss-Distribution Systems, 30 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 618, 620 (1957).
26. The fallacy of this line of reasoning is pointed up by the fact that it has been
held that the serviceman "incurs" these costs when he is originally billed for them,
even though later they are paid by the Government, or when he pays them and is
reimbursed by the Government. See American Indem. Co. v. Olesijuk, 353 S.W.2d 71
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Smith v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 52 Wis. 2d 672, 190
N.W.2d 873 (1971).
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that injury to one individual may also cause injury or loss to others,
and that this secondary loss should be recompensed directly, as is the
loss of the injured party.
Unfortunately, this concept of recovery runs contrary to two welldefined trends in tort law which have developed in the last hundred
years. First, the law has been reluctant to recognize an extended
damage concept; and second, it has been even more reluctant to allow
27
recovery for economic, as opposed to personal injury, damages.
Furthermore, for economic reasons the tort of per quod practically
disappeared during the nineteenth century;2 when governments began
to seek recovery under per quod in the early part of the twentieth
century, most courts considered the tort an anomaly and either abolished
it or severely restricted its application. As a result, in a series of
extremely technical, ill-reasoned opinions, the courts of every common
law country, except Canada,2 0 eventually denied the government's right
to recovery under per quod. °
Attempts at recovery by our federal government generally paralleled
developments in the rest of the world. The first attempt at recovery
was the inclusion of a statutory subrogation-assignment provision in
27. Probably the classic American case denying economic damages incurred by
a person other than the injured party is Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d
200, 203-04 (Ohio App. 1946), wherein the court denied an employee the right to
recover for his loss of continued employment as a result of the gas company negligently destroying the manufacturing plant where he was employed, throwing him

out of work.
28. The tort of per quad has never been a large source of litigation. Seavey,
Liability to Master for Negligent Harin to Servant, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 311.
Apparently, less than 20 cases have considered the tort in the entire history of
American jurisprudence. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 802 (1957). But this trickle almost
completely ceased in the nineteenth century when labor was plentiful and the obligation of the employer to care for the employee injured in the scope of his employment
had not yet been imposed. As a result, when an employee was injured through someone else's negligence, the employer simply replaced the injured worker from the
willing pool and did not have to resort to suit for damages. See Fleming, supra note
15, at 1485; Note, Federal Common Law in Governmental Action for Tort, 41 ILL.
L. REV. 551, 558 (1946).
29. Nykorak v. Attorney-Gen., [1962] Can. S. Ct. 331, aff'g 23 D.L.R.2d 485
(B.C. 1961) ; The King v. Richardson, [1948] Can. S. Ct. 57, rev'g [1947] Can. Exch.
55; The Queen v. MacCauley, [1955] Can. Exch. 320.
30. Australia: Attorney-Gen. (N.S.W.) v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1955] A.C.
457 (P.C.), aff'g 85 Commw. L.R. 237 (H.C. 1952) (police); Commonwealth v.
Quince, 68 Commw. L.R. 227 (H.C. 1944) (military personnel). Australia does, however, allow recovery for some civil servants. Commissioner for Railroads (N.S.W.)
v. Scott, 102 Commw. L.R. 392 (H.C. 1959).
Eire: Attorney-Gen. v. Ryan's Car Hire, Ltd., [1965] Ir. R. 642 (Sup. Ct.
1964), overruling Attorney-Gen. v. Coras Iompair, 90 Ir. L.T.R. 139 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ;
Minister of Fin. v. O'Brien, [1949] Ir. R. 91 (Sup. Ct.) ; Attorney-Gen. v. Dublin
United Tramways Co., [1939] I. R. 590 (H.C.), aff'g 73 Ir. L.T.R. 131 (Cir. Ct. 1939).
Great Britain: Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Hambrook, [1956] 2 Q.B.
641 (C.A.).
Israel: Jewish Agency v. Shechter, 11 Pieskei-Din 1329 (1956) ; Vieder v.
Attorney-Gen., 10 Pieskei-Din 1246 (1954).
Union of South Africa: Union Gov't v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., [1956]
1 S. Afr. L.R. 577 (A.D. 1955).
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the Federal Employee's Compensation Act of 1916.31 Similar provisions were later included in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act 2 and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. 3
In the late 1930's, the Veterans Administration (V.A.) instituted
a program to recover the costs of treating injured veterans for nonservice connected injuries, based upon an administrative regulation
requiring, as a condition for receiving care at V.A. facilities, that the
veteran assign to it any rights he might have to recover the costs of
his treatment. 4 Direct statutory authority for this regulation is at best
questionable.35 The program remains in effect as an alternative to the
36
Recovery Act.
The last of the pre-Recovery Act programs, and probably the
closest lineal ancestor to it, was the Army recovery program of World
War 11." In 1943, the War Department, without fanfare or explanation, amended an existing Army regulation providing for the administrative collection of damages for injury to government property to
include collection for injury to Army personnel.3 ' The original amend31. 5 U.S.C. § 8131 (1970). Although the heading of the section refers to subrogation, the text actually provides that the injured employee may be required to
assign his claim.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 351-53 (1970). The money collected under these sections did not
go into the general treasury, but instead was returned to the special fund created by
Congress to provide the benefits granted under the acts. In the case of money
recovered under the Recovery Act, the funds are credited to the medical care account
of the agency furnishing the care. Each year, Congress reduces the medical appropriation for each agency from the amount requested in its budget by the estimated
collections by the agency under the Recovery Act. All administrative costs for collection are borne by the agencies out of their regular appropriations and are not deducted
from the amounts collected. See 45 OFF THE RECORD 10 (1970).
34. 38 C.F.R. § 17.48(d) (2) (Supp. 1972). This assignment provision appears
to be an implementation of section 17.62(a) which provides that charges will be made
for services rendered where it is later established that the person is not eligible for
such care. Id. § 17.62(a).
35. The legal basis for the programs was challenged in dicta in United States v.
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 238 F.2d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 1956). The Administrator
buttressed his regulation upon his general supervisory power, 38 U.S.C. §§ 210(c),
621 (1970), and upon the fact that veterans are not entitled to treatment for nonservice connected injuries, if they are financially able to pay for such care. Id. §
610(a) (1) (B).
36. See Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. United States, 445 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1971) ; J.M. Tull Metals Co. v. United States, 123 Ga. App. 78, 179 S.E.2d
543 (1970).
37. See Comment, Federal Practice: The Rebirth of Federal Law, 34 CORNELL
L.Q. 110, 113 (1948), in which it was claimed that tort recovery for injured government workers was a settled policy under per quod servitium prior to the Army
program, citing Op. SOL. POST OFFICE 590 (1926). This opinion advises that the
Post Office might recover the costs of hiring a substitute mailman to replace one injured
by a tortfeasor. This author's research has revealed no other reported attempts by
government agencies to recover medical costs, except for the plans previously described.
38. Army Reg. 25-220 (May 13, 1943). The administrative procedure under this
regulation was very similar to the present practice under the Recovery Act. The
regulation provided, in addition to recovery for medical expenses, that the Government
could recover the cost of transporting the injured serviceman, as well as his pay and
allowances during the period of his disability. These items are not recoverable under
the Recovery Act.
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ment to the regulation cites no authority to support the War Department's right to make these collections. However, subsequent litigation challenging the program made clear that the Government was
attempting to base its recovery on per quod servitium amisit."9
It took slightly less than two years for the first test case, United
States v. Standard Oil Co.,4" to reach the courts. In Standard Oil,
one of the oil company's truck struck and injured an Army private as
he was attempting to cross the street in a clearly marked crosswalk. 4
As a result, the private was hospitalized and unable to perform his
military duties. Although the negligence of the truck driver was rather
clear, the company obtained a release from the private.4 2 Subsequently,
the Government made a demand upon the oil company for the medical
care it had furnished and for the private's pay while he was disabled.4"
When Standard Oil refused to pay, suit was initiated.4 4
In by far the most scholarly opinion in this series of cases, Judge
Yankwich upheld the Government's right to recover. He disagreed
with the contention that the private stood in a master-servant relationship with the United States;45 instead, he concluded that military
service created a status similar to the French concept of institution,46
39. See United States v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 64 F. Supp. 289, 290 (E.D.
N.C. 1946); United States v. Standard Oil, 60 F. Supp. 807, 810 (S.D. Cal. 1945),
rev'd, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
40. 60 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
41. Id. at 808.
42. The release was in standard form releasing the driver and Standard Oil from
all claims arising out of the accident. Payment was in a lump sum, and there was no
specific language dealing with hospital or medical expenses. Id. at 813.
43. Id. at 809.
44. This case was an extremely poor choice for a test case. The release clearly
prevented the Government from attempting to support its recovery on its derivative
claim. Further, the release put the Government in the unenviable position of asking
the court to require Standard Oil, at least technically, to pay for the same items of
damages twice. Finally, as will be seen in the discussion of the appeal, California
has a statute which incorporates the cause of action per quod servitium amisit. Therefore, the outcome of this case would not be authority for recovery in other states not
having the statute, unless the right of recovery can be based upon federal common law
created independently of state law.
45. Similar holdings have been the basis for the rejection of governmental claims
in most countries. Soldiers and policemen, for technical reasons, are held not to be
servants. See Attorney-Gen. (N.S.W.) v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1955] A.C. 457
(P.C.), aff'g 85 Commw. L.R. 237 (H.C. 1952) (police); Commonwealth v. Quince,
68 Commw. L.R. 227 (H.C. 1944) (military personnel). Judge Yankwich felt that,
for the purposes of per quod servitium amisit, the master-servant relationship should
be determined by the medieval standards when the tort first developed. Clearly, by
the modern control standard, the private is a servant. Further, the Government could
argue with great authority that the government-soldier relationship is in many ways
the closest modern equivalent of the medieval master-servant relationship. See
Fleming, supra note 15, at 1488.
46. Institution is a term coined by French jurists to characterize certain solidarities which lie at the basis of social action:
Such institution gives rise to droit institutionnel, a body of rights arising from
the communality of the group . . . in which each member exercises certain
rights and has obligations not as an individual, but as a member of the institution,
according to the position he occupies . ...
60 F. Supp. at 811.
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giving rise to certain rights and obligations. "These rights or obligations stem, not from the members as individuals . . . but from the
basic fact which brought [the institution] into being. ' 4 7 This buttressed
his conclusion that:
[I]t is clear that both the soldier and the Government have
certain rights and obligations arising from the [relationship or
institution] and that a third party who, through his tortious act,
interferes with it to the detriment of the Government, is responsible for the mischief he causes .... [T]he Government, which
through the negligent act of a third party, is put to the expense
of hospitalizing a soldier and loses his services during a period
for which it is compelled to pay him his wages, has a claim
cognizable in this court.4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 9 The court held that since
the Government's claim was not based upon statute, its right to recover
was no greater than any other private party in litigation, and was
controlled by state, rather than federal, substantive law." The circuit
court held that the matter was controlled by a California statute which
allowed recovery for injury in the master-servant context, 5 1 but agreed
with the lower court that the government-soldier relationship was not
one of master-servant.
The Government then appealed to the Supreme Court.52 Here
again it made the mistake of arguing that the government-soldier relationship, while not a master-servant relationship, was similar, and
that therefore per quod servitium amisit should be extended to cover it.
Thus, rather than presenting a situation where it was asking the Court
to extend an existing tort action to cover a different factual pattern,
the Government was asking the Court to create a new tort or greatly
47. Id.
48. Id. at 810. Some ten months after the Yankwich decision, the issue was again
raised in United States v. Atlantic Coast Lines R.R., 64 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C.
1946). The Government's handling of this case was extremely inept. It did not distinguish between the torts of per quod servitium amisit and interference with contractual relations, engendering the subsequent confusion by the court. Further, taking
the lead from Yankwich, it did not claim that the relationship between the injured
serviceman and the Government was a master-servant relationship, but instead argued
that it was analogous to that relationship. Finally, it did not dispute the court's
characterization that the tort of per quod servitium was limited to menial servants.
The result was predictable, the court refusing the Government's claim for recovery.
Id. at 293.
49. 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946).
50. This point is extremely important and one which has been much in dispute.
The Ninth Circuit cited United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328, 339-40 (1924),
to support its conclusion as to the applicability of state law.
51. CAL. CIv. CODE § 49 (West 1954). See id. § 2009. Under these sections, a
movie actress was held to be a servant for the purpose of allowing the studio with
which she was under contract to recover, if it could satisfactorily establish its damages.
Darmour Prods. Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P.2d 664
(Ct. App. 1933).
52. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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broaden the scope of an old one. For reasons which will be considered
in the next section, the majority of the Court was unwilling to do
this.5" As a result of the adverse decision in Standard Oil the Army
deleted the recovery provisions from its regulation in late 1947"4 and
made no further attempt to recover these costs until after the passage
of the Recovery Act.
II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND
RULES OF DECISION

Before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,5 5 the federal courts had

developed a substantial body of federal common law separate and
apart from state law. For this reason, it was not unusual for the

federal district courts of a particular state to reach a result completely
opposite to the local state courts. The Erie decision altered this
approach, the Court holding that the federal courts would no longer be
free to create a body of federal substantive law, but would be obligated
to follow the substantive common law of the state wherein it sat.56
In a series of cases beginning with Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., however,57 the Court made it clear that the Erie rule directly controlled
only those cases involving jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship5 " The problem of delimiting those areas wherein federal common
53. Justice Jackson, in a strong, well-reasoned dissent, rejected the majority's
arguments against acting as the moving force in the creation of tort law, and maintained that the Court should have created a new tort in view of its holding that
federal rather than state substantive law should control. Id. at 318 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). This restriction of the Court's role in the creation of law has been severely
criticized by others. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 708 (1953) ; Hart, supra note 10, at 532-33; 26 TEXAS L. REV.
353, 355 (1948).
54. Army Reg. 25-220 (Sept. 15, 1947).
55. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
56. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 265 (1946) ; McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse
of "General" Law in the Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126 (1938).
57. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
58. Justice Rutledge summarized this conclusion in Standard Oil when he said:
"The great object of the Erie case was to secure in the federal courts, in diversity
cases, application of the same substantive law as would control if the suit were brought
in the courts of the state where the federal courts sit." 332 U.S. at 307. Thus stated,
the policy behind Erie is identified to be that there should be no difference between
the substantive decision of a state court and the federal court where the suit is
between private citizens and the jurisdiction of the federal court is based solely upon
diversity of citizenship. This is consistent with the original policy decision to give
the federal courts diversity jursdiction - to protect foreign suitors from the prejudice
of local courts and juries. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 588-90 (J. Hamilton ed.
1875) (A. Hamilton). So long as the local courts show no discrimination against the
foreign plaintiff, there is no justification for different substantive conclusions by the
federal and state courts within a particular state.
But this principle should not be limited to diversity suits; the same principle
should also govern in other areas where private litigants have access to federal courts.
Some courts have, in fact, concluded that Erie "applies, whatever the ground for
federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its source in state law." Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 697; Friendly, supra note 11, at 408
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law would continue to exist was at least partially solved by Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States,59 in which the Court stated that whenever
the federal government exercised one of its constitutional functions,
any challenge to such an exercise presented a constitutional question
to be resolved by federal, rather than state, law.6 °
The impact of this decision was to free the federal courts from a
constitutional imperative to apply state law in those areas involving
the operation of the federal government. It did not mean that state
law might not be held to be the controlling rule of law, but it did mean
that the federal courts were not compelled to accept the state law rule.
Instead, the federal courts were left free to fashion an appropriate
rule from whatever source they chose, e.g., state common law, preErie federal decisions, English common law, or scholarly writings. In
Clearfield Trust itself, the Court rejected the prevailing state law rule
in favor of the creation of a separate federal common law rule. 6
n.122. These authorities rely upon the language of Erie itself, 304 U.S. at 78, and the
subsequent Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103 (1939).
This same principle may be applied to the Standard Oil situation. The United
States, like any other citizen, has the right to protect its property under state law,
and may seek a vindication of its rights by suit under state law in state courts. For
a fine statement of this theory, see Justice Grier's opinion in Cotton v. United States,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850). When it does so, it is treated like any other
private citizen. Lynch v. United States, 18 Okla. 142, 144, 73 P. 1095, 1096 (1903);
United States v. Board of Fin. & Revenue, 369 Pa. 386, 399, 85 A.2d 156, 164 (1951).
The result should be no different when it chooses to sue on the same right in its own
courts, where that jurisdiction is based exclusively on the fact that the Government is
the party-plaintiff. The Maternally Yours case suggests that state law should control.
In this instance, the federal government is merely seeking to enforce its rights under
state law in a federal court.
On the other hand, it should be clear that the federal government as sovereign
has authority to establish rules for protection of its own property. This would seem
to be a power inherent in the concept of sovereignty. The role of the federal courts,
as opposed to Congress, in this area is the subject of dispute. However, when the
federal courts have authority to act and create this body of federal law, the Erie
principle suggests incorporation of state law as the guiding principle. It is submitted
that this was what the Ninth Circuit meant when it cited Erie as authority for applying state law in Standard Oil.
59. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
60. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it raises a constitutional
question in every case involving the federal government's activities. The federal government, under the Constitution, is a government of specifically enumerated powers.
Therefore, whenever it acts, it must act according to one of the powers granted by
the Constitution or implied therefrom. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 67, at 156 (1968) ; Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J.
1428, 1443 (1960).
61. This decision and other cases where the Court has chosen to formulate special
federal rules where government interests are involved has led to a tendency on the
part of some writers to suggest that special rules should always govern when the
federal government is a party to the litigation. See, e.g., Gorrell & Weed, Erie
Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 276, 296 (1948); Comment, Erie
Limited: The Confines of State Law in the Federal Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561,
569 (1955); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of
Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1094 (1964).
On the other hand, there are those who argue that the creation of a special
federal rule in Clearfield Trust was a mistake and that the state law rule should have
been incorporated as the federal rule. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 828-32 (1957). The Court itself seemed to back away from
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It was against this background that the Standard Oil case reached
the Supreme Court.62 Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, first
rejected the Ninth Circuit's application of Erie as the controlling principle in favor of the Clearfield Trust test.6" Turning then to the question
of whether to incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision, he
acknowledged that state law could be incorporated as the federal rule
and outlined three instances where he felt that such incorporation was
appropriate, namely: ( 1 ) cases involving title to real property purchased
by the Government; (2) where Congress has consented to the application of state law by failing to provide a complete rule in an area of
federal concern; or (3) where the state law furnished a convenient
solution to the problem which was not inconsistent with the protection
of federal interests.6"
Since the facts of Standard Oil indicated that neither of the first
two of these situations existed, the application of state law depended
upon the outcome of the third test. To determine whether state law
furnished a convenient solution, Justice Rutledge offered the following
factors for consideration: (1) the need to protect federal supremacy
in the performance of federal functions; (2) the need for uniformity of
decision throughout the country; and (3) the inference that Congress
did not want long-settled ways of handling problems changed, if it
were aware of the problem and had not acted.65
Justice Rutledge then applied these considerations to the problem
of governmental recovery and concluded that federal, not state, law
would provide the more appropriate rule. First, he pointed out that
the soldier-government relationship was distinctively and exclusively
a creature of federal law.66
[W]e know of no good reason why the Government's right to
be indemnified in these circumstances, or the lack of such right,
should vary in accordance with different rulings of the several
its Clearfield Trust holding in Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell,
352 U.S. 29, 32-34 (1956). Justice Douglas dissented in Parnell, arguing that the
majority decision was inconsistent with Clearfield Trust, and that the Clearfield Trust
doctrine should have been re-examined. Id. at 35.

62. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
63. Id. at 305.

64. Id. at 308-09.
65. Id. at 310.
66. While the relationship is clearly based on federal law, the relationship is not
unique to federal law. The state militia or national guard, when not in federal service,
is governed by state law. See, e.g., Hays v. Illinois Terminal Transp. Co., 363 I1. 397,
2 N.E.2d 309 (1936) ; Goldstein v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939). Likewise, we have seen from the British Commonwealth cases that the relationship between
firemen and policemen and the government presents basically the same problems.
There is a body of state law concerning the rights of state and local governments to
recover for injuries to members of these groups. See, e.g., City of Birmingham v.
Crow, 267 Ala. 216, 101 So. 2d 264 (1958) ; Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Co., 337 Pa. 1, 10 A.2d 434 (1940).
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states, simply because the soldier marches or today perhaps as
often flies across state lines.67
Having concluded that it was more appropriate to fashion a separate rule of federal substantive law than to incorporate the existing
state law as the rule of decision, Justice Rutledge then proceeded to
dispose of the Standard Oil case on the amazing grounds that the
federal courts under the constitutional tripartite division of power had
no authority to create new bodies of federal common law or new
common law remedies without authority from Congress.6" Thus, the
Standard Oil case does not stand for the principle that there is no
common law remedy of per quod in the United States,69 but rather that
the federal courts are powerless to extend the remedy beyond its existing limits. 7° Such protection would have to come by act of Congress.

i1.

GUIDELINES

Our next task is to outline the guidelines which will be used to
evaluate the courts' efforts at statutory interpretation and creation of
supplemental federal common law. Professor Mishkin was one of the
first to attempt to develop some uniform guidelines that the federal

courts might use in creating interstitial federal common law. 7 ' He
indicates that, as in the case of statutory construction, the first guide
should be the congressional intent behind the statute.72 Often this, or
the language of the statute itself, will indicate whether the federal
courts should incorporate state law as the federal rule or set about
creating a new body of independent federal decisions. Even where it
is not conclusive of the issue, it will often give some indication which
way the decision should go.
67. 332 U.S. at 310.
68. He also asserted that the executive branch lacks power to make governmental
policy in this area. Id. at 314. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss this
problem in detail. There are those who feel that Justice Rutledge's interpretation of
the role of the federal judiciary is correct. See Symposium, The Future of a Federal
Common Law, 17 ALA. L. REV. 10 (1964). On the other hand, the Rutledge position
has its severe critics. See Hart, supra note 10, at 532; Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) ; Kurland, The
Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827
(1960). The Rutledge idea appears to have been approved in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), but rejected in Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1958), and Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
69. The case is often cited for this proposition. See, e.g., Snow v. West, 250
Ore. 114, 440 P.2d 864 (1968). To the contrary, Justice Rutledge indicated that such a
right existed under state common law in the United States. 332 U.S. at 303-04 nn.4-6.
70. The Government conceded that the soldier-government relationship was not
one of master and servant, but claimed that the remedy should be extended by analogy.
332 U.S. at 303 n.3.
71. Mishkin, supra note 61, at 811.
72. Id.
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However, there are other considerations which differ from those
applicable to statutory interpretation, because in this area the question
is whether to incorporate existing state law or to create a new rule
of federal law. Thus, we must not only consider what rule would give
us the best substantive result, but also what effect the imposition of a
potentially different federal rule will have upon existing rights and
duties under state law. Beyond this, Professor Mishkin suggests that
we should consider the distribution of power between the national and
state governments and the roles of the two judiciaries."
Two commentators have subsequently attempted to build on the
beginning made by Professor Mishkin, and give more concrete formulations to these guidelines."4 They conclude, for example, that the starting
point is the Rules of Decision Act,7" which provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States in cases where they
apply.7"
This statute, they argue, creates a presumption that state law should
be incorporated as the federal common law on any given subject.77
However, this presumption can be overcome and a federal rule created.
Whether to override this presumption depends upon our conclusions
on two basic issues: whether a federal rule is necessary to foster
federal policies, 7 or for the purpose of uniformity.7 9 These tests are
essentially the same tests proposed by Justice Rutledge in Standard
Oil."° However, Justice Rutledge did not accept the presumption of the
application of state law nor did he attempt to develop these tests.
Both commentators, however, caution that there must be a distinction made between the situation where a federal policy is involved
and where the United States is merely a party to the controversy. 8'
In addition, a distinction is suggested between the active, policy73. Id. at 812.

74. Comment, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969)
after cited as The Federal Common Law] ; Comment, supra note 60.

[herein-

75. The Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1515; Comment, supra note 60,

at 1431.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
77. The Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1517-31; Comment, supra note
60, at 1432.
78. The Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1527-29.
79. Id. at 1529-31.
80. 322 U.S. at 310.
81. The Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1528; Comment, supra note 60,
at 1442.
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making functions of the federal government, and its housekeeping
functions, such as the protection of its property.82
Finally, they argue that there are two significant justifications for
uniformity: (1) to insure uniform decision throughout the United
States, and (2) to avoid inconvenience to the federal government in
administering its various operations throughout the country.8 3 However, Professor Mishkin 84 and the others85 agree that too much stress
has been placed on uniformity, such that it has become an end in itself.
As a practical matter, uniformity within the federal system is a virtual
impossibility absent action by the Supreme Court, and the Court,
apparently, has neither the time nor the inclination to police the lower
federal courts to ensure the uniform application of federal common
law. Further, uniformity may have disastrous effects upon the rights
of private parties, who must readjust their rights under state law after
the federal government has been satisfied. 6

IV.

NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S

RIGHT

The first major question to arise under the Act, and one which
goes to the very heart of the recovery program, is the nature of the
Government's right under the statute. The insurance industry and
many defense attorneys have steadfastly maintained that the right is
merely one of statutory subrogation. 7 The Government has persistently
argued that its right is an independent statutory right, not based on
subrogation. The reason for this dispute, as will become readily
apparent in the succeeding sections of this Article, is the effect of
certain actions of the insured, such as a release, upon the Government's
right to recover, and the necessity for notice of the Government's
interest.
It is apparent that the dispute in this area focuses upon the common
law theory of liability upon which the Recovery Act is based - whether
it was the intent of Congress to allow only subrogation, or to create an
independent right upon a theory of per quod servitium amisit. Neither
approach is entirely satisfactory. The subrogation approach is based
upon an analogy of governmental care to medical payments coverage or
health insurance. Unfortunately, the right of these insurers to equitable
82. Comment, supra note 60, at 1443.
83.
84.
85.
at 1447.
86.
87.

The Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1530.
Mishkin, supra note 61, at 813.
The Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1530; Comment, supra note 60,

Mishkin, supra note 61, at 831.
Groce, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act and Its Side Effects, 36
INS. COUNSEL J. 1259 (1969) ; Groce, Public Law 87-693: The Federal Medical Care
Recovery Act - A Partial Dissent, [1965] INs. L.J. 337.
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subrogation has never been firmly established."8 Beyond this, it has been
claimed that the Government is not entitled to equitable subrogation. 9
Thus, it would have to be argued that the Government's right is based
upon legal subrogation, with the Recovery Act supplying the necessary
subrogation clause normally found in the private insurance contract.
The per quod servitium approach also has its defects. Per quod
is not well-recognized or accepted in the United States,9" and has never
been extended beyond the master-servant, or possibly the more modern
employer-employee, relationship.9 1 Clearly, however, the Recovery Act
is not limited to persons in this relationship with the Government.
Instead, it applies whenever the Government is required to furnish
care.92 The largest single group of recipients - military personnel have almost universally been held, in similar actions in other countries,
not to be in a master-servant relationship with the governments they
serve.9" While these decisions seem to be incorrectly decided, they
nevertheless must be considered. In England, it has been held that
no public servant - whether civil servant,9 4 police officer, 5 or military
personnel - is a servant for the purposes of per quod. Thus, it is
clear that Congress, in adopting the Recovery Act, did not simply
incorporate into federal law an existing common law remedy.
The difficulty as to the nature of the Government's right arose
because the bill as originally introduced provided:
(a) in any case in which the United States is authorized
or required by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental
care and treatment . . . to a person who is injured or suffers a
disease . . . under circumstances creating a tort liability upon
some third person . . . to pay damages therefor, the United States

shall be subrogated to any right or claim that the injured or
diseased person . .

.

has against such third person

. . ..

88. More frequently than not this right has been denied. See, e.g., Michigan
Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954). For a general discussion of the problem, see R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1964); Capwell & Greenwald, Legal and Practical Problems Arising
from Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident Policies, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 256
(1971) ; Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. REV.
841 (1962).
89. Turner, Hospital Claims (42 U.S.C. 2651): The United States as a Subrogee,
12 AF JAG L. REV. 44 (1970).
90. Seavey, supra note 28.
91. Darmour Prods. Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal. App. 351,
27 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1933).
92. See note 8 supra.
93. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Quince, 68 Commw. L.R. 227 (H.C. 1944).
But see The King v. Richardson, [1948] Can. S. Ct. 57.
94. Inland Revenue Comm'rs Hambrook, [1956] 2 Q.B. 641 (C.A.).
95. Attorney-Gen. (N.S.W.) v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1955] A.C. 457 (P.C.)
(Austl.).
96. 108 CONG. REc. 6669 (1962) (emphasis added).
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A staff memorandum prepared by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare" criticized this subrogation approach on the basis that
any rights the injured party might have would depend upon the applicability of the collateral source doctrine since the injured party would not
have incurred or paid these expenses."' Thus, under the bill as introduced, the right of the United States to recover would be denied in
those states not recognizing the collateral source rule. 9 The House
Judiciary Committee recognized the merits of this criticism, but rather
than rewriting the entire Act to reflect the inclusion of an independent
right, and thereby eliminate any ambiguity as to its intent,' 0 it merely
supplemented the provision to provide that "the United States shall
have a right to recover from said third party the reasonable value of
the care and treatment so furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to
this right be subrogated .

. . ."'0

In its report, the Committee indicated

the purpose for this change to have been:
[To make] clear that the United States is granted a distinct right
to recover its costs and that this right is to be effectuated through
a partial subrogation to any right which the injured party or
diseased2 person may have to proceed against the negligent third
0
1

party.

The bill as amended passed Congress without further revision.
There would seem to be five possible interpretations as to the
effect of the amendment. First, it could be argued that the change
was simply poorly drafted and that the language dealing with subrogation is merely a residue from the earlier draft and to be treated
as a dead letter."0 3 Such an approach obviously violates the canon
of statutory construction which provides that some meaning is to
be assigned to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Second,
it could be argued that the subrogation language merely indicates
that the independent right of the United States is conditioned upon
there being liability on the part of the third person to the injured
party. ' 4 Or, third, it could be argued, as the insurance industry
would prefer,' that the basic right is one of subrogation and is
97. S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (Appendix).
98. United States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
99. See note 6 supra.
100. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968), severely criticized
Congress for this approach.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1970) (emphasis added).
102. H.R. REP. No. 1534, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
103. Cf. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968), which suggests a
similar reading for the six-month provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1970).
104. United States v. Fort Benning Rifle & Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884, 887 (5th
Cir. 1967).
105. United States v. York, 261 F. Supp. 713, 714 (W.D. Tenn. 1966) ; Groce,
The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act and Its Side Effects, 36 INS. COUNSEL J.
1259 (1969).
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merely independently created by federal law. This position would
clearly seem to ignore the reason for the amendment - to free the
Government's right from the applicability of the collateral source rule.
Fourth, it could be argued that the amendment merely creates an
independent right in place of the original subrogated right, but additionally provides that the independent right can be procedurally
enforced by subrogation." °6 Finally, it could be argued that the statute
was intended to do two things: to establish clearly that the Government had an independent cause of action to recover these costs, and
to effect a legal subrogation of whatever rights the injured party had
under state law to the United States. As indicated, equitable subrogation has never been recognized in health insurance or medical
payments contracts. 7 In all probability, since the Government's claim
would have been treated similarly, the statutory subrogation provision was necessary to establish this right of subrogation.
The courts seem to be hopelessly confused over the proper interpretation which should be adopted. With the one exception of the
early unreported decision in United States v. Freese,'0

the courts

have all agreed that the United States has an independent right.0 9
But here the agreement ends.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, in United States v. Greene,"' adopted interpretation one,
treating the subrogation language as a dead letter:

Furthermore, our attempted application of the legal analysis
which underlies the concept of subrogation discloses the Congress
could not have created a subrogation in the government for medical care it had dispensed even if Congress had so desired The
tortfeasor had no obligation to pay the tort victim for medical
care which the victim had received gratis. Therefore, no underlying lobligation existed which could support a subrogation analyn
sis.

However, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Fort Benning
Rifle & Pistol Club,"2 specifically rejected interpretation five for interpretation two:
106. Comment, The Riqhts and Remedies of the United States Under the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act, 74 DICK. L. REv. 115, 116-23 (1970).
107. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
108. Civil No. 66C69(2) (E.D. Mo., Dec. 30, 1966).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Wittrock. 269 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967)
United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
110. 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
111. Id. at 980. It would seem that the judge ignored the possible application of
the collateral source rule which might allow the injured party to recover these costs.
112. 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
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The problem with such a construction [interpretation five] is
that the quoted language, instead of complementing the right
created in the government with an additional right of subrogation, refers directly to and modifies the primary right initially
created by the statute.
We think that, properly construed, the Act creates in the
United States an independent right of recovery. This right, however, is "subrogated" to the extent that it is subject to any
state substantive defenses which would negate the requirement
that the injury arise "under
circumstances creating a tort liability
'1 1 3
upon some third person.
Interpretation four is not without its champion. The Third Circuit, in United States v. Merrigan,"4 concluded:
The right of recovery was thus conferred on the government
and subrogation was made one of the remedial consequences of
the government's right, a subsidiary equitable remedy, which
did not limit the primary right." 5
As suggested, interpretation three is generally favored by the
insurance industry. 6 In United States v. Guinn,"7 a district court
said: "This statute creates an independent cause of action on the
part of the government. . . . In prosecuting such an action, the
Government is cast in the role of a subrogee.""
Likewise, interpretation five has its supporters. The West Virginia court in Tolliver v. Shumate"' stated:
The statute . . . not only confers upon the United States the
right of subrogation to any claim which the person receiving such
care and treatment may have . . . but it also creates an independent right in the United States to recover. .. .
It submitted that the last of these five alternatives as adopted by
Tolliver is the one which most nearly adheres to the intent of Con113. Id. at 887.
114. 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968).
115. Id. at 24. This view has been accepted by a number of authors. See, e.g.,
Noone, May Plaintiff Include the United States' Claim Under the Federal Medical
Care Recovery Act Without Government Intervention?, 10 AF JAG L. REv. 20
(1968) ; Comment, supra note 106.
116. Groce, The Federal Medical Care Recovery Act and Its Side Effects, 36
INS. COUNSEL J. 1259 (1969).
117. 259 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J. 1966).
118. Id. at 773. This case held that the release by the injured party did not release
the insurance company because it had knowledge of the Government's interest. The
court's position would seem to have been overruled by United States v. Merrigan,
389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968).
119. 151 W. Va. 105, 150 S.E.2d 579 (1966).
120. Id. at 109, 150 S.E.2d at 582. See Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119, 124 (8th
Cir. 1967), rev'g in part 255 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Ark. 1966).
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gress. Admittedly, the language of the section appears to lend itself
better to alternative four. However, it must be remembered that the
Act was enacted against the background of the prior experiences of
the Veterans Administration and the Army. The V.A. procedure,
like the older program under the Federal Employee's Compensation
Act, followed the derived rights concept and was based on either subrogation or assignment from the injured party. The Army World
War II program, rendered invalid by the Standard Oil case, was
based upon the independent rights concept of per quod. The Comptroller General, in his report urging congressional action, acknow-

1 21
ledged both of these programs as bases for his recommendation.
Yet, it is clear that the Comptroller General did not realize that these
recovery programs were based upon two entirely different legal concepts, each of which has a separate and distinct heritage rooted in
the ancient common law, one equitable, the other purely legal.
The original drafters of the Act elected to follow the derived
rights approach. 122 Subsequently, the House Judiciary Committee
was convinced that an independent right was more appropriate. Like
the Comptroller General, the Committee does not seem to have fully
appreciated the separate legal bases for the two approaches, so it simply
proceeded to engraft the new independent right upon the already
existing subrogation scheme in the original bill. The end result, admittedly inartfully drafted, would seem not only to establish the
Government's independent right, but also to subrogate the Government to the injured party's claim, if any, under state law. The congressional committee reports indicate that the Judiciary Committee
did not intend to change the pre-existing arrangement in the bill as
originally drafted, but merely intended to add an independent right
of recovery which would not be subject to the variations of the state
collateral source rules.12 3
Having concluded that it was the congressional intent to create
these two separate rights, we will now turn to an examination of
some of the particular problems under the Act and ascertain the consequences dependent upon whether the Government pursues its independent or subrogated right. Three areas will be considered: (1)
substantive law and defenses, including statutes of limitation; (2)
the effect of notice by the Government, releases by the injured parties,
and the collateral source rules; and (3) procedural problems such as

121. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2.
122. It is not clear why this route was selected, but one can speculate that the
drafters used the provision in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
8101, 8131 (1970), as a guideline, since neither the Veterans Administration nor the
Army program were based upon statute.
123. H.R. REP. No. 1534 & S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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jurisdiction, res judicata, and the Government's ability to recover
through suit by the injured party.
V.

SUBSTANTIVE

A.

LAW

AND

DEFENSES

Substantive Law

It should be clear in the case of the subrogated right that the
Recovery Act does nothing more than subrogate the Government
to the existing rights of the injured party under state law. Because
of the supremacy clause, the Recovery Act would override any state
law or policy against splitting a cause of action"2 4 or against subrogation in general. However, whether there is any claim on which
the Recovery Act can operate depends upon state substantive law. 1 25
In order for the Government to have a subrogated claim, two things
must be present under state law: the party causing the injury must
be tortiously liable to the injured party, giving him a right to recover, and the state law must follow the collateral source rule, allowing the injured party to recover for care paid for by another. 2 '
It is not clear, however, what substantive law would govern
if the Government were to pursue its independent right. We can
immediately eliminate the issue of the collateral source rule, because
it is clear that Congress has created the independent right in order
to avoid any question of its application. However, the Act specifically provides that the United States shall have this independent
right only "under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some
third person." '27 How these circumstances are to be determined, i.e.,
by state or federal law, has never been directly litigated. The courts
have assumed that state law applied, as have most of the government agencies commenting upon the Act.
The language of the Act, unlike that in the Federal Tort Claims
12
Act, does not specify that state substantive law will govern. However, since a federal statute is involved, clearly the matter is a question of federal, not state law. In the absence of such specific language by Congress, the Lincoln Mills doctrine, authorizing the federal
124. United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266, 267 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
125. Which particular state will depend in large part upon the conflict of laws
rule of the state in which the accident happened. United States v. Moore, 311 F.
Supp. 984 (M.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd, 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed,
41 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1973) (No. 72-988).
126. For a discussion of the problems with the application of the collateral source
rule under the Recovery Act, see notes 259-63 and accompanying text infra.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1970).
128. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1970). See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1 (1961).
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courts to settle the matter under federal common law,' 29 would
seem to be pertinent. This does not mean that the final outcome
may not be the application of state law by incorporation, but simply
that the courts are not compelled to incorporate state law. Thus,
the courts are faced with a choice of a rule of decision which should
be solved according to the standards outlined above.'
The choice
at first glance may seem obvious, perhaps explaining why the lower
courts have not addressed themselves to this point.
It is submitted, however, that the solution is not that obvious.
It should be remembered that the Supreme Court in Standard Oil held
that recovery in this area was a question of federal fiscal policy and
that, as such, it was an inappropriate area for the incorporation of
state law."' Similarly, in Urie v. Thompson," 2 the Supreme Court
held that what constituted negligence under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act'3 3 was to be decided under federal, not state, substantive law.
The starting point for the solution of this issue would seem to
be the presumption raised by the Rules of Decision Act,13 4 namely,
that state law will govern. But as suggested in the previous discussion, this presumption is subject to challenge when the court is required to construe a federal statute. Therefore, the question is: Do
the considerations involved in the choice of a rule of decision suggest that the court should override the presumption and create a
body of federal substantive common law as was done in Standard
Oil, Clearfield Trust, and Urie?
Turning first to the legislative history of the Act, it is clear from
the language quoted earlier 35 that the congressional intent was to
reverse the Standard Oil decision and allow governmental recovery.
This alone, however, is not of much help because the Court in Standard
Oil contemplated that any recovery, if authorized by Congress, would
be on the basis of a body of federal substantive law, not state law.
Yet, the various reports written by the government agencies commenting on the bill, and the Senate and House committee reports,
129. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See United
States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972). Here the court held that section
2651(a) conferred on the United States an independent right of recovery free from
limitations on recovery imposed by a state's family immunity law. Id. at 790.
130. See text accompanying notes 71-86 supra.
131. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
132. 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949).
133. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970), which provides in part:
Every common carrier by a railroad while engaging in commerce . . . shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such
carrier . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence . . . of such carrier . ...
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
135. See text accompanying notes 96 & 102 supra.
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all speak of the purpose of the bill as being to destroy the windfall
to defendants resulting from the Government's inability to recover
these costs. Thus, it would seem that the legislative intent was only
remedial - to destroy a windfall only where a windfall existed. Since
such a windfall would only exist where under state law the defendant
would be liable for these costs, it can be argued that it was Congress'
intent to tie the existence of the Government's right to state substantive law. The legislative intent, therefore, while not strong, would
seem to be against overriding the presumption in favor of state law.
The second test which should be examined is whether federal
law is necessary to foster the federal policy involved. Standard Oil
identified the policy involved herein to be federal fiscal policy. Congress, through the Recovery Act, enunciated a fiscal policy whereby
the Government should recover only where a windfall resulted from
the Government's former inability to recover. As such, the problem
is not one involving national sovereignty or disputes between states areas which have been recognized as requiring the application of
special federal rules of decision.3 6 Rather, it is a question of the
Government protecting its proprietary interests as a body politic."37
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has held that in the protection
of its proprietary rights, the United States, as a body politic, is to be
treated as any ordinary citizen, whose rights are governed by state
law.' 3 ' However, in Standard Oil and Clearfield Trust, the Court
moved away from this principle, on the ground that the use of state
law would impinge on the constitutionally controlling federal policy.
Yet, the Court in Standard Oil offered no explanation as to how
the state law would have such an effect. As a result, a number of
commentators have concluded that whenever the federal government
is a party to a suit, in its capacity either as the sovereign or as a body
13 9
politic, the outcome should be controlled by federal substantive law.
The validity of this conclusion is subject to challenge. Since
proprietary suits do not significantly involve the policy-making function or the sovereign status of the federal government, unless it can
be clearly demonstrated that the application of state law will impair
the implementation of federal policy, there would seem to be no reason
to displace state law as the rule for decision. 4 ° In view of the apparent
legislative purpose, the application of state law in the case of the
136.
tion, 67
at 1520.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional PreempCOLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1069 (1967) ; The Federal Common Law, supra note 74,
Comment, supra note 60, at 1443.
See, e.g.. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850).
Gorrell & Weed, supra note 61; Hill, supra note 136.
The Federal Common Law, supra note 74, at 1527.
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Recovery Act would seem to further, rather than impinge upon, the
federal policy.
The last test to be applied is the test of uniformity - whether
the implementation of the federal policy behind the Recovery Act
requires a uniform result. In order to answer this question, it is
necessary to analyze the tangible product of the imposition of a uniform federal rule governing the Act. Notwithstanding the fact that
the job of the enforcement agencies would be made much easier, and
that there would be a certain symmetry to the law, it is submitted
that these are not sufficiently important goals to merit the imposition
of a uniform federal rule. In fact, the results of a uniform federal
rule would run contrary to the expectations of most of the citizenry,
who justifiably feel that the consequences of their tortious conduct
should be the same, whether a private citizen or a private soldier has
been injured. As pertinently noted by one commentator, this expectation plays a significant role:
Since the law stakes out the boundaries of permissible conduct,
the more certain it is, the more efficiently society should be able
to function. To the extent that a court's choice of applicable
rules of decision contradicts the expectation of the party involved, the law becomes
less certain and less able to serve as a
1 41
guide to conduct.

Therefore, the imposition of a federal rule of substantive law to
govern initial tort liability under the Recovery Act would seem to
be counterproductive, interfering with the matrix of expectations
under the existing body of state law. A review of the factors to be
considered in determining whether state or federal substantive law
should govern the question of initial tort liability confirms the posi14
tion taken by the courts in assuming that state law will control.
B.

Defenses

Having established that state substantive law should control the
initial determination of liability, regardless of whether the Government is suing on its subrogated claim or its independent cause of
141. Comment, supra note 60, at 1445.
142. The reference is to the complete state law on torts, including strict liability
as well as negligence. Cf. Palmer v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1972). In the rare places where there is no state common law, such as on federal
enclaves and in admiralty, federal substantive law will govern in the absence of federal
statutes to the contrary. It appears clear that there can be actions in admiralty under
the statute, cf. Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 319 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1970), but the
statute specifically excludes the most common admiralty suit - maintenance and cure.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 249, 2651 (1970).
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action, this Article will now consider the effect upon governmental
recovery of various defenses available under state law. The central
question, therefore, is whether the rationale developed for the initial
application of state law compels its application to matters of defense.
1.

Contributory negligence of the injured party

It would seem that no detailed analysis should be necessary to
conclude that when the Government is suing on its subrogated right,
the state defense of the contributory negligence of the injured party
should bar the Government's recovery. The subrogated right being
derivative, -the person holding that right stands in no better position
than the person from whom the right is derived. Therefore, state
law will determine initially whether there is tort liability and then
whether this liability is excused in whole or in part. 4 '
This concept is illustrated by Ferguson v. Ben M. Hogan Co.,'44
in which a husband attempted to recover for medical expenses incurred by his wife. First, the court found that the wife was forty per
cent contributorily negligent and then that the husband's claim was
derivative. As a result, it reduced the husband's recovery pro tanto. 4 5
The question remains, however, whether this same analysis can
apply where the Government is suing on its independent right. First,
it should be emphasized that we are dealing with an area where state
law, if it controls at all, does so through its incorporation as the
federal rule. This does not mean that the entire state law must be
incorporated. Federal policy may suggest incorporation of one part
of the state law, while rejecting other parts. Thus, reference to state
law for the purpose of establishing initial liability under the Recovery
Act does not foreclose rejection of state law on the issue of contributory negligence, if the policy of the Act dictates a different
conclusion on this issue.
The Ninth Circuit, by way of dicta in United States v. Housing
Authority, 46 has been the only court to address itself to the effect
of contributory negligence of the injured party on the Government's
independent right:
Where the injured party is himself negligent, and where under
state law that contributory negligence absolves the third person
143. Cf. United States v. Housing Authority, 415 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Gera, 279 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 389

F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968).

144. 307 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
145. Id. at 664-66.
146. 415 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1969).
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from liability,14 7then the United States cannot recover from that
third person.
This dicta assumes two things: (1) that the language of the Recovery
Act requires the use of state law for the determination of the effect
of contributory negligence; and (2) that under state law contributory
negligence would bar governmental recovery. It is submitted that
neither of these assumptions is accurate.
Again, the critical language of the Recovery Act is "under circumstances creating tort liability upon some third person."' 48 In all
states, other than Illinois where the plaintiff must prove himself free
149
from contributory negligence in order to be entitled to recover,
contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, excusing liability
already created. Thus, it would be consistent with the language of
the Act to hold that state law would determine whether tort liability
has been created, while rejecting state law for the purposes of determining when that liability will subsequently be excused."'
Since the language of the Act does not compel the application of
state law with respect to the effect of contributory negligence, we
are again faced with making a determination as to whether the policy
of the Act would be furthered by its incorporation as a matter of
federal common law. The answer would seem to be yes. If the policy
of the Act were to maximize governmental recovery, it would clearly
be advantageous to reject state law as the rule of decision and adopt
an independent rule of federal law that contributory negligence has no
effect upon the Government's right of recovery. Such a rule could
easily be supported under the Clearfield Trust and Standard Oil
rationales. However, the policy behind the Act is merely that the
United States should be able to recover when a private citizen is
able to recover.' " ' The Government is merely attempting to protect
its proprietary rights as a body politic and not attempting to seek any
preferred position. Thus, state substantive law should control the
effect of contributory negligence by the injured party just as it
governs the initial issue of liability.
147. Id. at 243. See United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf.
United States v.Fort Benning Rifle & Pistol Club, 287 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1970).
149. See, e.g., Williams v.Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.
2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
150. See United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) ; United States v.
Allstate Ins. Co., Civil No. 14,961 (W.D. La., Jan. 1, 1970) (both cases deal with a
peculiar provision of Louisiana law). See also Dombrink, Medical Care Recovery
Act: Defenses: Immunity of Husband Tort!easor from Suit by Injured Wife, 26
JAG J. 138 (1971).
151. See text accompanying notes 87-123 supra.
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It is submitted that the dicta quoted above is also inaccurate in
its forecast of the effect of contributory negligence under state law.
As previously indicated, the independent right of the Government is
patterned on the ancient right per quod servitium amisit. Further-

more, the right of parents to recover for medical care furnished their
children and the similar right of the husband to recover for the care
of his wife are both based on this doctrine. It has been held in a
number of cases that the right of the parent or the husband is sub152
ject to the contributory negligence of the injured family member.
Significantly, however, the reasons for these decisions are often
obscure' 53 and apparently stem from a misconception of the nature
of the action. This has led Dean Prosser154 and other notable legal
scholars 55 to reject the conclusions of these cases and to argue that
contributory negligence of a family member should have no bearing
on recovery under per quod. The Victorian Supreme Court, in Lloyd
v. Lewis,156 recognizing the true nature of the claim, recently reached
this conclusion, refusing to allow contributory negligence to bar recovery. A similar result should occur when the Government is suing
5
under the Recovery Act.

2.

7

Interspousal and parent-child immunity

Again, where the Government is seeking recovery on its subrogated
action, for the reasons outlined in the discussion on contributory negligence, state law will control in its own right and not by incorporation.
However, the effect of familial immunity doctrines on the subrogated right is not easily predictable.' 5" It has been held that the
immunities, unlike contributory negligence, do not excuse the underlying tort liability, but merely present a procedural bar to its enforce152. See, e.g., Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Colo. 474, 462 P.2d 589
(1969); Wineman v. Carter, 212 Minn. 298, 4 N.W.2d 83 (1942) ; Callis v. Reliance
Laundry Co., 185 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198 (1925).
153. W. PROSSER, TORTS 892 (4th ed. 1971).
154. Id. at 893.
155. See, e.g., Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child
in an Action for Loss of Services, 2 U. C-i. L. REV. 173 (1935) ; James, Imputed
Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REV. 340, 354 (1954).
156. [1963] Vict. 277 (Vict. Sup. Ct.).
157. However, if such a result under state law should not be forthcoming, the
federal courts should not use this as an excuse to replace state, with federal, substantive law. The like or dislike for a particular state rule should have no bearing
on the rule of decision choice, unless the state position impinges upon the government
program. Mishkin, supra note 61, at 817. Here, since the Government is simply
seeking the same treatment that would be accorded the average citizen, denying his
right, as well as the Government's, does not affect the government policy.
158. Hopefully, as time passes the need for such prediction will diminish. W.
PROSSER, TORTS 864, 868 (4th ed. 1971), indicates that 19 jurisdictions have abandoned
inter-spousal immunity and 15 have abrogated parent-child immunity, many within
the last decade.
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ment on policy grounds concerning the possible effect of litigation
upon the family relationship.1 59 Presently, the almost unanimous position of the courts is that a third-party who is vicariously liable to the

injured spouse cannot escape liability by asserting the interspousal
immunity of the primary tortfeasor."6 ° The immunities have taken on

the character of a personal defense which cannot be raised or used by
one outside the relationship. It can be expected that states following
the immunity theories will extend their coverage to prevent recovery
by a subrogee, thus barring the Government's recovery on its subrogated claim.
Two circuits, the Third' and the Fifth, 6 2 have recently considered the immunities problem in connection with the Government's
63
independent right. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Haynes,1
relying on cases involving state statutes of limitations,'4 held that
the Government's right was not controlled by the peculiar Louisiana
provision giving the husband, as the master of the community, the
right of recovery for medical care furnished his wife. Instead, it concluded that this statute did not have any effect upon the creation of
the tort liability and, therefore, was not a part of the federal common
law developed under the Act. Thus, the court adopted the Clearfield
Trust and Standard Oil concept of an independent body of common
law separate from state substantive law.
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Moore,'65 has flip-flopped
on this issue. In its original opinion, Judge Biggs, speaking for the
majority, had recognized the right of the federal courts to create
federal common law in those areas where Congress had authorized
the courts to do so.' 66 Judge Biggs further stated, as the district court
had held, 16 7 that the language of section 2651 (a)

68

mandated the appli-

159. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 165 (1964), considered in United
States v. Moore, 311 F. Supp. 984 (M.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd, 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972).
160. W. PROSSER, TORTS 868-69 (4th ed. 1971).
161. United States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'g 311 F. Supp. 984
(M.D. Pa. 1970).
162. United States v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
163. 445 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
164. United States v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Fort
Benning Rifle & Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967). For a discussion of these
cases and the statute of limitations problems, see notes 210-30 and accompanying
text infra.
165. United States v. Moore, No. 19,070 (Apr. 27, 1972), rev'd on resubmission,
469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972).
166. No. 19,070, at 10.
167. 311 F. Supp. at 986. The court held that it was bound to apply the Pennsylvania rule on conflict of laws, citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941), a decision under the Erie doctrine. 311 F. Supp. at 985. The adoption of the
state conflict of laws rule would seem to have been the appropriate choice, but this
choice is not controlled by Klaxon, but rather by incorporation as the federal common
law rule on the subject. See Mishkin, supra note 61, at 802-04.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1970). See text accompanying notes 124-42 supra.
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cation of state law. Additionally, he agreed with the lower court that
it was impossible to distinguish between substantive and procedural
defenses. 69 Judge Biggs summarized these conclusions as follows:
[W]e conclude that in the instant case the preferable test lies in
the language of the statute itself, in particular the phrase "circumstances creating a tort liability upon a third person." We think
we cannot avoid construing this as a reference to the tort law of
a State or Territory. Congress was not looking toward some
federal tort but to local laws of torts, and it would seem to us to
be a highly metaphysical argument to contend that intrafamilial or
interspousal immunities, while they may be part of the familial
law of a State, such as Maine, are not under the circumstances at
bar completely applicable to Maine tort law. It follows, we think,
that the creation of liability under Maine law cannot be considered apart from the Maine doctrines of immunity. . . . We
think that we must take the Maine law as a whole ...
Finally, Judge Biggs determined that the United States could not
recover its medical costs because Maine law1 7 ' provided that intrafamily immunity extinguished any tort liability which may have existed
on Mrs. Moore's part with respect to her husband and children, and
as a result with respect to the United States.
Upon resubmission,'1 72 Judge Kalodner, who had vigorously dissented in the first decision, 73 wrote the majority opinion. He indicated
that state law should not govern:
We are of the opinion that the Medical Care Recovery Act confers
on the United States an independent right of recovery which is
unimpaired by the vagaries of state family immunity laws; otherwise stated, enforcement of the Act is free of the impact of rightto-sue limitations imposed by a state's family immunity laws.' 7 4
In support of this conclusion, Judge Kalodner relied heavily on the
Haynes decision and earlier decisions holding that governmental recovery was not subject to state statutes of limitations. 5 He relied
169. Such a distinction had been developed in United States v. Greene, 266 F.
Supt). 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967). This division between substantive and procedural defenses
is clearly unproductive because, as the Supreme Court has remarked: "[Tlhe line
between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes."

Hanna v.

Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
170. No. 19,070, at 13.
171. Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963).
172. United States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1972).
173. No. 19,070, at 15.
174. 469 F.2d at 790.
175. In contrasting the present case with the statute of limitations cases, Kalodner
reasoned that "lilt cannot reasonably be contended that a disability to sue by reason
of a statute of limitations is different than a disability to sue imposed on a spouse or
minor child under a state's family immunity laws." Id. at 791. With all due respect
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most heavily, however, upon the rationale of the Standard Oil case,
holding that the relationship between the Government and its men in
uniform is a matter of federal law and should not vary according to
17 6
A contrary
the differences in various state family immunity laws.
holding, in his opinion, would have been "grievous error, in utter
disregard of the Congressional intent in enacting the ... Act. Subjec-

tion of enforcement of the Act to vagaries of state laws would make
a shambles of the Act.' 1

77

As an alternative holding, Judge Kalodner

based the reversal of the trial court upon the grounds that it misinterpreted the effect of the Maine intrafamily immunity doctrine.'17
Kalodner felt that the doctrine did not destroy liability for tortious
conduct by the spouse or parent, but merely placed a procedural obstacle
to the court's enforcement of such liability when the plaintiff is the
179
other spouse or a child. Predictably, Judge Biggs strongly dissented.
It is clear that Judge Kalodner believed that the congressional
intent behind the Act mandated the creation of a rule of federal common law and that such a rule should be uniform, fashioned by the
federal courts without reference to the variations of state law. On
the other hand, it is clear that Judge Biggs believed that the language
of the Recovery Act demanded the application of state law in this area.
It is unfortunate that most of the judges appear to be confused
as to the role that the state law of intrafamily immunity should play
under the Recovery Act. The language of the Act does not demand
that state substantive law control the existence of tort liability, as
Judge Biggs suggested. The language of the Act merely indicates
that there must be original tort liability upon the third person before
the Act can operate. As we have already determined, the policy behind
the Act suggests incorporation of state substantive law as the federal
rule of decision to determine original liability.'8 0 However, it is not
clear whether this same policy suggests the adoption of the state substantive defense of intrafamily immunity. In the view of the district
court and Judge Biggs in Moore, this question did not arise; nor
did the Haynes court address itself to this problem, since it merely
assumed that state law did not govern by incorporation.' 8
to Judge Kalodner, it is submitted that the two ought to be treated differently because
of the historical development of the statute of limitations treatment. See notes 211-30
and accompanying text infra.
176. 469 F.2d at 792-94.
177. Id. at 792.
178. Id. at 794.
179. Id. at 794-803 (Biggs, J., dissenting).
180. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text supra.
181. It is submitted that the Haynes court was attempting to resort to federal law
to avoid application of the state law which it felt reached an undesirable conclusion.
As suggested (see note 157 supra), dislike for the particular state rule is not a proper
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Only Judge Kalodner considered this problem, concluding from
the Standard Oil and Clearfield Trust cases that the Government's
rights should not be subject to differences in state law. He, therefore, opted for the creation of a uniform rule of federal common law,
which was to take precedence over a state law concerning the sub1 82
stantive defense of intrafamily immunity.
At this juncture, it is pertinent to recall that the Standard Oil
and Clearfield Trust concept of an independent federal common law
has been discredited, except in those situations where state law would
improperly impinge upon federal policy.'
Likewise, we have seen
that there has been too much stress upon uniformity of result in
federal cases, to the point where uniformity has become an end in
itself."8 We have already established that the primary purpose of the
Recovery Act was to insure that the federal government would be
able to recover medical costs like any private citizen. Since the rights
of a private citizen will vary according to the availability of state
affirmative defenses, including intrafamily immunity, an alteration of
this result in favor of the Government by the application of a separate
federal rule of decision would defeat the policy underlying the Act.
Thus, the policy of the Act reinforces the presumption that state law
rather than independent federal law should control.'
Therefore, the
district court and Judge Biggs were correct in applying state law,
but for the wrong reason.
Having suggested that the policy behind the Recovery Act dictates
incorporation of the state substantive law in regard to intrafamily
immunity, it is appropriate to discuss the effect of the defense on the
Government's recovery, since it appears that both the district court
and Judge Biggs in Moore, and the court in Haynes, misinterpreted
the effect of the state substantive law upon the Government's claim.
In both cases there was no question that the act of the spouse created
tort liability. Therefore, under the terms of the Act, an independent
cause of action arose on behalf of the Government. The question then
is whether, in either case, the state substantive defense should bar the
enforcement of that right.
ground for replacing it with a federal rule of decision. It is unfortunate that the
court took this position because it could have reached the same result by applying
the state law.
182. As to what the federal common law rule should be, Judge Kalodner would
appear to favor the nonrecognition of intrafamily immunity. He discusses at some
length the trend toward abandonment of the doctrine by an increasing number of
courts in recent years. 469 F.2d at 794 n.4. Incidentally, this position would maximize
governmental recovery.
183. See notes 138-40 and accompanying text supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
185. See notes 74-82 and accompanying text supra.
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In the Moore case, both the district court and Judge Biggs on
appeal, were of the opinion that the Maine intrafamily immunity
doctrine destroyed the spouse's cause of action rather than merely
barring an action to recover on the wrong. The majority, through
Judge Kalodner, disagreed. He felt that the doctrine merely barred
enforcement for policy reasons, but that the underlying liability remained.18 Further, he concluded that the doctrine constituted a
personal defense, not applicable to third parties.' 87 This interpretation
is consistent with the conclusion reached by the majority of states
under similar situations.18 8 Thus the policy reason for the Maine
intrafamily immunity doctrine, the maintenance of domestic tranquility, 8 9 is absent when the Government seeks to assert its independent
claim. Also, unlike the situation where the Government is suing on
its subrogated claim, its claim is not derivative, and it is not being
placed in a better position than the person from whom the claim
derives. Thus, under state law, the doctrine of interspousal immunity
should have no effect upon the Government's independent claim. 9 °
The Louisiana problem presented in the Haynes case is slightly
different. While the effect of the Louisiana provision is the same as
interspousal immunity, at least where the husband is the tortfeasor,
its legal basis is apparently quite different. Under Louisiana law, the
claim for medical expenses for the injured wife is an item of community property. Likewise, the husband is held to be the master of
the community and the party entitled to sue to protect its interests.
Where the husband is both plaintiff and defendant, as he is in such a
case since he caused his wife's injury, under Louisiana law there is
"confusion" and the cause of action is destroyed. 9 '
As far as the Recovery Act is concerned, the problem here is no
different than in those states which do not allow the splitting of a
personal injury cause of action, even by subrogation. Although Okla186. This is the position taken by the vast majority of courts in connection with
the statute of limitations. The running of the statute does not destroy the underlying right, but merely bars use of the courts to enforce the right if the statute is
pleaded as an affirmative defense. If the statute is not pleaded, then the court will
enforce the right. If the statute destroyed the right, then the court of its own motion
would have to dismiss the action even though the defendant did not plead the statute.
187. United States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788, 794 (3d Cir. 1972).
188. See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
189. Cf. Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963).
190. Dombrink, su pra note 150. Dombrink makes a similar analysis of the guest
statutes in those few states in which the statute does not prevent the creation of
tortious liability but merely presents a procedural bar to recovery. In those states,
he properly concludes that the Government could recover its costs.
191. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2217 (West 1952). See Dumas v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 241 La. 1096, 134 So. 2d 45 (1961) ; Adams v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 142 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 1962).
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homa is one such state,1 92 the court in United States v. Nation'9 3
properly held that the Recovery Act provision creating the independent cause of action in the Government overrode, by virtue of the
supremacy clause, the state policy against subrogation.' 94
Similarly, in the Haynes case, the Recovery Act's creation of the
independent right should have overriden the state policy assigning this
claim to the community. As to the Government's claim, there would
have been no "confusion." Faced with the identical situation presented in Haynes, another district court earlier had apparently followed
this analysis, refusing to dismiss the Government's suit. 9 '
In light of the apparent difficulty that both the Fifth and Third
Circuits have had with -the question of whether state or federal law
should govern the applicability of intrafamily immunity, the problem
cannot be considered settled. However, it would seem from the policy
considerations behind the Act that state law, rather than an independent federal common law rule, should become the rule of decision
by incorporation. However, in most instances, the state rule should
be interpreted only as a bar to suit by the spouse or child, and therefore not applicable to suit by the United States, at least when that suit
is based upon its independent cause of action.
3.

Contributory negligence of the United States

Three cases have examined the question of what effect the negligence of the United States should have on its right of recovery.' 96
All three involve military personnel, further complicating analysis,
197
since servicemen cannot sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Further, in all cases, the contributory negligence on the part of the
Government was passive, vicarious negligence based solely upon the
negligence of one of its employees, other than the injured party.
Finally, in all cases, the United States appears to have pursued its
independent, rather than subrogated right.
192. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ingle, 494 P.2d 320 (Okla. 1972);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 489 P.2d 480 (Okla. 1971);
Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Krueger, 486 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1971).
193. 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
194. Id. at 267-68.
195. United States v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civil No. 14,961 (W.D. La., Jan. 1, 1970).
196. Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse,
319 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ; California-Pac. Util. Co. v. United States, 194
Ct. Cl. 703 (1971).
197. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Their remedy is an administrative one through military channels. The exclusion of military personnel from
the coverage of the Tort Claims Act means that sovereign immunity has not been
waived as to them.
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In two of the cases, Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse,l"" and CaliforniaPacific Utilities Co. v. United States,9 9 the court held that the contributory negligence of the Government would bar recovery, while the
third, Maddux v. Cox,20 held it would not. None of the cases discuss
the problem in any detail, and thus they are not very enlightening.
It would appear that the conclusion on this issue again depends
upon whether the United States seeks to enforce its independent or
subrogated right. If it seeks to enforce its independent right, its
position is not radically different from a suit to recover for injury to
its personal property. In such cases, based upon the "both ways" test,
the vast majority of courts have held that the contributory negligence
of the employee will be imputed to the employer both for the purposes
of making him liable to the other party and to prevent the employer
from recovering for his own property damage.2"1 This test is based
on the logic that if negligence is to be imputed for one purpose, it
should be imputed for all. However, this ignores the basis for the
rule in the first place, which was to provide a solvent defendant in
cases involving employees. 20 2 Certainly, the same policy does not
require that the defendant be deprived of his right to recover for the
injury to his property. The "both ways" test has been the subject
of a great deal of criticism by legal scholars, 2 8 and there are some
indications that it will, in time, be discarded in the master-servant
area as it has been in others. 0- 4 Until that time, however, it would
bar the Government's independent suit."0 '
When the Government is suing on its subrogated claim, the
conclusion should be different: the Government should be able to
recover at least a portion of its costs. In such an instance, the claim
comes from the injured party. With respect to this injured party, the
Government is normally a joint tortfeasor, 20 ' but its negligence is
198. 319 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
199. 194 Ct. Cl. 703 (1971).
200. 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967).
201. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 23.6 (1956).
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41
YALE L.J. 831 (1932) ; James, supra note 155; Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the
Doctrine of Imputed Contributory Negligence, 20 FORD. L. REV. 156 (1951).
204. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Hoxie, 375 Mich. 102, 133 N.W.2d
167 (1965) ; Weber v. Stokley-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540
(1967) ; Johnson v. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 222 Ore. 377, 352 P.2d
1091 (1960).
205. California-Pac. Util. Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 703 (1971). Nikiforow
v. Rittenhouse, 319 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1970), mistakenly characterizes the
Government's right as an equitable one and denies recovery on the basis that the
Government was contributorily negligent.
206. In those cases where the injured party cannot sue under the Tort Claims Act,
the entire loss should fall on the third-party tortfeasor, and theoretically the Government should recover its entire cost. However, since subrogation is an equitable
remedy, adjustment should be made to reflect the negligence of the Government. See
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derivative or vicarious, resulting from the act of its employee. °7
Most states allow contribution between tortfeasors, at least where one
of the tortfeasors' negligence is vicarious or passive.
Thus, the
Government should be able to recover its costs less any deductions
for contribution.

20 9

4.

Statute of limitations
Whether the Government's right is controlled by state or federal
statutes of limitations now seems to be settled by federal statute.
Although the Recovery Act itself contains no statute of limitations,
in 1966 Congress enacted a general comprehensive statute of limitations 211 of three years applicable in all government tort actions. 21 '
The applicability of this general statute of limitations to the
Recovery Act was first examined in United States v. Gera, 12 in
which the court held that the federal statute of limitations did not
apply because the Government's action under the Recovery Act was
not an action founded in tort. The judge then went on to hold that
Dombrink, The Right to Collect Contribution or Indemnity From the United States
When a Federal Employee or Serviceman is Injured, 27 JAG J. 69, 73 (1972).
207. It should be remembered that the Government has an action against its
negligent employee. Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
However, it is the Government's practice not to pursue this remedy unless the action
of the employee was grossly negligent or he has the benefit of liability insurance.
See, e.g., Army Reg. 27-38 (Jan. 15, 1969).
208. See, e.g., Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
209. Any recovery should include any adjustment which should be made because
the Government does not choose to seek indemnity from its own employee. Id. There
is one other problem that often may appear at this point. In both California-Pac.
Util. Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 703 (1971), and Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 319
F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1970), the Government had entered into contracts which the
court interpreted to require it to reimburse the third-party tortfeasor for his costs,
including judgment and litigation expenses. In such cases, attempting to assert
medical care claims merely results in shifting funds from one of the Government's
pockets into another, less the cost of litigation. This type of indemnity contract is
quite common in government defense contracts. As a result, claims against government contractors are not to be asserted without permission of the Judge Advocate
General of the service involved. See, e.g., Army Reg. 27-39 (Jan. 15, 1969);
Judge Advocate General, Dep't of the Army, Federal Medical Care Recovery Act
Letter No. 171, Apr. 27, 1971.
210. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415-16 (1970).
211. Id. § 2415(b). Normally, the statute starts running when the right of action
first accrues, but the 1966 enactment included a special saving provision allowing all
actions which had accrued before its effective date to be brought within three years
thereafter. Cf. Forrester v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
Section 2416 contains a provision which may become very significant in Recovery
Act cases. This section provides that the statute will be tolled where "facts material
to the right of action are not known and reasonably could not be known by an official
of the United States charged with the responsibility to act in the circumstances."
28 U.S.C. § 2 416(c) (1970). This may mean in Recovery Act cases that the statute
will not start to run until the government official charged with recovery learns of
the case or has information which would lead him to suspect that it involves a
Recovery Act claim. Moreover, there appears to be substantial delay in acquiring
this information in many cases involving civilian treatment. See Long, supra note 24.
There are no cases under the statute yet, so it is impossible to predict its eventual
interpretation. The legislative history of the Act tends to support this theory. See
S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
212. 279 F. Supp. 731, 733 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
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this statute did, however, show a congressional intent to do away with
the historic concept that statutes of limitations do not run against
the sovereign. Finally, concluding that he must fashion a limitations
provision as a matter of federal common law, he elected to incorporate
the state statute of limitations.2 1
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed,2

14

concluding that the

Government was not subject to any state statute of limitations. It
then held that Recovery Act claims were subject to the three-year
federal statute.2 15 This conclusion would seem to be correct, since it is
clearly a tort action, albeit a statutory one, and the legislative history of
the federal statute makes it clear that it applies to all Government
tort actions. 216

The Government's subrogated right presents a more difficult
problem. It has been consistently posited throughout this Article that
state, rather than federal, law controls the Government's subrogated
right. This position is based upon the contention that Congress in
the Recovery Act did no more than subrogate by federal statute the
Government to whatever right, if any, the injured party had. A
natural extension of this theory would be that the Government as the
subrogee would be subject to the state statute of limitations. However, the Recovery Act was enacted against a background of a longstanding court-made rule that the federal government as sovereign
was not subject to any statute of limitations, regardless of whether it
was suing in its sovereign or proprietary capacity. Congress, by
enacting the federal statute of limitations, clearly intended to subject
the direct actions of the Government to the federal statute; whether
it also intended to subject the indirect or derivative actions to the
statute as well is less clear. That Congress had the power to do so if
it so desired is not to be debated.
The legislative history of the 1966 statute tends to support the
conclusion that Congress intended that it cover all actions by the Government, direct and indirect."' The only case involving a derivative
right decided since the 1966 enactment also suggests this conclusion. 18
Additional light can be shed on the congressional intent from the
decisions under the Recovery Act. The Gera case and three earlier
213. Id.
214. 409 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1968).
215. This holding was followed in Forrester v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1157
(W.D. Pa. 1970). See Whitaker v. Talbott, 122 Ga. App. 493, 177 S.E.2d 381 (1970).
216. S. REP. No. 1328, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
217. Id. at 8-9.
218. United States v. Winter, 319 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. La. 1970), held that the
subrogated right of the United States was not subject to the state statute of limitations, and then concluded in dicta that it was probably governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2415
(1970). Id. at 522.
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cases, United States v. Greene,19 United States v. Jones,2 and United
States v. Fort Benning Rifle & Pistol Club,221 held that the Government was not subject to state statutes of limitations.2 22 These holdings
would seem to run contrary to the concept that in situations in which
the Government is suing to protect its proprietary interests there is
a presumption that state law controls. Instead, they seem to support
the discredited concept of Clearfield Trust and Standard Oil that
there is a separate body of federal common law, not tied to state law,
which covers these actions.223
However, we have indicated that the presumption for applying
state law can be overcome, if it can be shown that its application will
unduly impinge upon some federal policy. While Gera, Jones, Greene,
and Fort Benning do not reflect such an overriding federal policy, it
is submitted that such a policy is considered to exist and that these
cases should be limited strictly to the area of application of the statute
of limitations. All of the cases, except Greene, make reference to
earlier Supreme Court decisions holding the Government not subject
to state statutes of limitations. In Gera and Fort Benning the reference was to United States v. Summerlin.2 4 Summerlin was merely
the most recent of a long line of cases 225' applying the ancient maxim
nullum tempus occurrit regi - time does not run against the sovereign - a mysterious concept bound up in the equally mysterious
concept of sovereignty.22 6 If the sole basis for the doctrine was that
it was within the prerogative of the sovereign, it could be argued that
the Government, in suing on its proprietary right, was not exercising
the powers of a sovereign, but merely those of a private citizen, and
state statutes of limitations should affect its rights like other state
227
substantive provisions.
However, there seems to be more to the doctrine. The Second
Circuit has stated that:
The policy underlying this exemption is that the failure of a
government employee to bring an action within the time pre219. 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. 111. 1967).
220. 264 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967).
221. 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
222. None of these cases, except Gera, considered the effect of the new federal
statute.
223. Cf., e.g., United States v. Housing Authority, 415 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1969);
Comment, supra note 106, at 120.
224. 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
225. Id. at 418. See, e.g., United States v. Nashville, C.&S.L. Ry., 118 U.S. 120
(1886) ; United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878).
226. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 68-69 (2d ed. 1970).
227. The Greene case indicates that the statute of limitations is a procedural

provision which the federal courts are free to disregard. However, the Supreme Court
has held that it is substantive as far as diversity of citizenship cases are concerned.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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scribed by a state statute of limitations should not bar the government from bringing the action if the action is one to enforce
public rights or to protect the public fisc.22 s
Thus, in Summerlin, the doctrine was applied to a case involving a
subrogated right acquired as the result of the payment of a loan
guarantee without discussion of the difference between the sovereign
functions of the Government and its right as a body politic. Subsequently, in Weissinger v. United States,22 the Fifth Circuit held that
it made no difference whether the suit was a result of the Government's
sovereign or proprietary functions.
It seems clear that, in the narrow area of statutes of limitations,
the presumption of the application of state law had been displaced
in favor of a separate rule of federal common law that the Government
was not subject to any statute of limitations. Congress, in turn,
has supplanted the federal common law rule by federal statute. Moreover, the adoption of the federal statute suggests that Congress intended the 1966 statute to occupy the area to the exclusion of
state law. 230 Yet due to the peculiar history, the cases decided in
this area are not precedent for the broader application of federal
common law to other substantive areas.

VI.

NOTICE TO TORTFEASORS,

RELEASE BY INJURED PARTIES,

AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE

A.

Notice and Release

It should be obvious that if the Government's right is an independent one, as characterized in the prior discussion on substantive
law and defenses, it cannot be affected by any action of the injured
party. Thus the release of the injured party would have no effect
upon the Government when it seeks to enforce its independent right.
Similarly, the giving of notice would not be required unless mandated by the Act or implementing regulations. 231 Although the de228. United States v. 93 Court Corp., 350 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1965).
229. 423 F.2d 782, 784 (5th Cir. 1968).
230. The one exception to this rule might be the rare case where the state statute
of limitations does not merely bar any enforcement action, but extinguishes the basic
liability. See United States v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 460 F.2d 17 (9th Cir.
1972), where the Government was attempting to take advantage of a California
uninsured motorist statute requiring that suit be brought within one year of the
accident. When the Government did not sue within that period, the court sustained
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the one year statute
was not a conventional statute of limitations, but destroyed the right to sue if the
action was not brought within the allotted time. In other words, no right to recover
vested in the Government until it had met the statutory prerequisite of filing within
the statutory period. Any inchoate right it might have had was destroyed and did
not vest when it failed to file in the allotted time.
231. 28 C.F.R. §§ 43.1-43.4 (Supp. 1972).
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fendants' bar, unwilling to acknowledge the Government's right as
an independent one, has litigated the matter on several occasions,
the courts have reaffirmed the proposition that the Government's right
under the Recovery Act is not dependent upon notice to the tortfeasor,23 2 or barred by prior release from the injured party2 33 or
judgment in his favor.2" 4
The validity of these decisions does not seem open to question.
At the time the original bill embodying the Recovery Act was being
considered, the insurance industry urged Congress to include a provision conditioning the Government's right upon the giving of notice
to the tortfeasor. 23 5 However, when the Act was revised to give
the Government its independent right, the Comptroller General
strongly objected to such a condition.136 Congress was apparently
persuaded, because no notice requirement was included in the final
Act nor was any such statement added by subsequent regulation.3 '
Once again, if the Government decides to sue on its subrogated
right, its claim will be entirely controlled by state law as to notice
requirements and the effect of releases from the injured party. In
most states, payment to the injured party and a release from him
will bar the claim of the subrogee unless the tortfeasor has notice
of the subrogee's claim.238 Thus, in order to be able to sue on the
subrogated right, the Government will have to give notice or show
that the tortfeasor is aware of its claim.23 9
There would seem, however, to be few cases where the tortfeasor
or his insurance company would not have sufficient information to
put them on notice to investigate further and discover the Government's interest in the case. It should be obvious that a potential
claim is present whenever the injured party is an active duty or
retired member of the armed forces. Further, it is difficult to conceive of an insurance company paying a claim without thoroughly
determining what treatment was actually rendered, by whom, and
at what cost. Such investigation would clearly put the company
232. United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
233. United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. 895, 896 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; United
States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 979 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ; United States v. Jones, 264
F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Va. 1967).
234. United States v. Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; United States
v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967). Cf. United States v. Stinnett, 318 F.
Supp. 1337 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
235. Letter from The Comptroller General to Senator James Eastland, May 28,
1962, in S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (Appendix).
236. Id.
237. 28 C.F.R. §§ 43.1-43.4 (Supp. 1972).
238. 16 G. COUcH, INSURANCE §§ 61.190-.191 (2d ed. 1966).
239. Cf. United States v. Guinn, 259 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J. 1966).
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on notice in situations where the care was furnished in a govern-

ment hospital, and should reveal that the Government paid the
bills where civilian treatment was rendered.24 ° It submitted that the
insurance industry, which, for economic reasons, opposed the Act

from the time of its proposal has chosen this issue in order to
fight a rearguard action against its implementation, rather than directing its attention and energies to solving the admittedly difficult problems of the effect of the Act upon the collateral source rule.
B.

Collateral Source Rule

The insurance companies have been placed in a rather difficult

position by the passage of the Act. It is clear that the Government
has an independent claim which, as previously noted, is not barred

by settlement with the injured party. However, the injured party
may likewise be entitled to recover these costs under state law where
the collateral source rule is recognized. If so, then the insurance
company or the tortfeasor may, at least theoretically, be required to
pay twice for the same damages. It is obvious that the tortfeasor
should not have to pay these damages twice, and careful analysis of the
problem will indicate how this can be avoided within the framework
of the Act and existing state law.
The starting point must be the Recovery Act. The supremacy
clause of the Constitution makes this Act superior to any state law
inconsistent with it.24 ' Thus, if we cannot accommodate the Recovery Act with the collateral source rule as developed by state law,
it is clear that the collateral source rule will have to give way. However, it is submitted that with certain adjustments the collateral
source rule can be accommodated to the Recovery Act.
The Recovery Act not only creates an independent right in the
Government to recover its medical costs, but also subrogates it to
any claim that the injured party might have had to recover those
costs. -42 Simple logic should indicate that if there is an independent
claim to recover these costs, the collateral source rule has no place,
since its sole purpose was to avoid giving the tortfeasor a windfall. If
there is an independent claim by the person furnishing the care, there
is no windfall and, therefore, no reason to favor the injured party
over the tortfeasor in its disposition. Further, even if the collateral
source rule continues to have some viability as a result of the Re240. Id.
241. United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266, 267 n.1 (N.D. Okla. 1969) ; United
States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 13 (E.D. Va. 1967).
242. See text accompanying notes 87-123 supra.
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covery Act, whatever rights the injured party might have, now
belong to the Government by subrogation. Although a cursory reading of Arvin v. Patterson43 and Whitaker v. Talbott,2 4 4 the two
cases which have discussed this issue, would seem to suggest the
contrary 24 5 - that the injured party's rights to recover these costs
under the collateral source rule have not been changed by the Recovery Act - a more careful reading reveals that these cases, in
fact, suggest the key to accommodating the Government's rights under
the Recovery Act with the collateral source rule.
The Government, by virtue of its rights under the Recovery
Act, is the only one ultimately entitled to recover these costs. However, the Government often elects not to pursue its rights, or does
so belatedly or elects to pursue its rights through the injured party.2 46
In these cases it would seem appropriate for the collateral source
rule to be given effect.
If the Government does not pursue its right within the period
of the federal statute of limitations, it no longer has a claim. In the
absence of this claim by the person furnishing the care, the reason
behind the collateral source rule is again applicable.24 7 The Whitaker
court pointed out that the accident involved in that case had occured
in 1965, but that Whitaker had not filed his suit until three years
after the effective date of the federal statute of limitations. It then
concluded that Whitaker could recover these costs because to deny
them to him would bestow upon the tortfeasor a windfall, which was
248
precisely what the collateral source rule was developed to prevent.
Similarly, the Government should be able to forego its independent
right and allow the injured party to claim these costs in his action
under the collateral source rule where there is a proper allegation
that the injured party is collecting them on behalf of the Govern249
ment as subrogee.
243. 427 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
244. 122 Ga. App. 493, 177 S.E.2d 381 (1970).
245. See Comment, The Medical Care Recovery Act, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 141

(1968).

246. This last alternative would seem to be based upon the Government's subrogated claim, which, in turn, is dependent upon the injured party being able to recover
under the collateral source rule. See text accompanying notes 264-81 infra.
247. 122 Ga. App. 493, 177 S.E.2d 381 (1970).
248. The court in Arvin v. Patterson, 427 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
reached the same conclusion on the same reasoning. However, the court in that case
mistakenly interpreted the Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1970), to require that
the Government intervene in the injured party's suit if it is brought within six months
after the injury. 427 S.W.2d at 644. For a discussion of this misconstruction of the
statute, see text accompanying notes 287-315 infra.
249. The ability to use this approach depends upon whether the state allows the
subrogor in a partial subrogation situation to sue for the entire claim and to hold a
portion of it for the benefit of the subrogee. Most states allow such a practice. See
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A difficult problem arises where the injured party claims these
costs and the Government's claim is not known, or where the injured
party makes no indication that he is going to hold the proceeds for
the benefit of the United States and the Government has made no
move to collect the costs separately. In the latter case, the tortfeasor
certainly would be justified in refusing to settle until the positions are
clarified and the Government committed. In either case, it would
seem appropriate for the tortfeasor to demand that the settlement
agreement include a provision obliging the injured party to hold the
tortfeasor harmless from any future claims made upon him for these
costs and to prosecute and bear the expense of any further litigation
arising therefrom."'
Where the injured party claims these costs as an item of
damages in his suit, in which he is not suing for the benefit of the
United States, and the Government shows no inclination to join
in the suit or to sue separately, it would seem appropriate, following
the rationale of Arvin and Whitaker, to allow recovery under the
collateral source rule. At this point the Government would seem
to have two options. First, since the award to the injured party
would have been contrary to the rights of the Government under
the Recovery Act, the Government may still sue the tortfeasor on
its independent cause of action. The judgment rendered for the injured party will be no defense,2 5' but the tortfeasor should be able to
implead the injured party as a third-party defendant. 212

Secondly,

the Government ought to be allowed to sue the injured party to
impress a trust for the amount of the medical costs recovered, since
the Recovery Act subrogated the Government to the claim of the
injured party. This latter approach was attempted in the first reported case decided under the Act, United States v. Ammons, 253
in which Judge Carswell dismissed the Government's case against the
injured party on the basis that the Act only provided a right to recover against the third-party tortfeasor. Judge Carswell adopted the
narrow interpretation of the power of the federal courts as set forth
by Justice Rutledge in Standard Oil and refused to supply a remedy
against the injured party.
Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1242 (1945). See also Noone, supra note 115, at 21-27. Louisiana
specifically does not. See Avery v. Scott, 216 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 1968), cert. denied,
253 La. 313, 217 So. 2d 410 (1969); Smith v. Foucha, 172 So. 2d 318 (La. App.),
cert. denied, 247 La. 678, 173 So. 2d 542 (1965).
250. Apparently, a similar provision was used in United States v. Greene, 266 F.
Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967), and United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D.
Okla. 1969), where the injured parties were joined as third-party defendants.
251. Cf. United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
252. Cf. United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Okla. 1969).
253. 242 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
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It is submitted that this decision is totally incorrect. As we have
seen, 54 the Rutledge concept of the power of the federal judiciary
has been rejected by the Supreme Court in subsequent opinions. 5'
Given the power of the federal courts to create federal common law
to supplement congressional acts,25 it is impossible to justify such
a refusal to force the injured party to disgorge funds he has wrongfully received.257 Such a holding would simply apply to the statutory
right of subrogation one of the well-recognized attributes inherent
in the concept of subrogation. This single ill-considered decision
by a district court can hardly foreclose further attempts to use this
remedy in the future.2 58
By allowing the application of the collateral source rule in the
first instance, the injured party is permitted to retain the benefits
normally due him under state law, subject to having those benefits
readjusted in favor of the Government should it seek to enforce its
rights under the Recovery Act at a later date. If the Government
does pursue its remedy, the tortfeasor can avoid double payment by
the techniques outlined above. Therefore, the collateral source rule
can be accommodated to the Recovery Act.

VII.

PROCEDURAL EFFECTS OF THE DIFFERENT RIGHTS

The Act provides two means for the Government to enforce its
rights: (1) it may at any time intervene in the injured party's
suit;259 or (2) after an interval of six months has passed, it may
254. See notes 55-70 and accompanying text supra.
255. See note 68 supra.
256. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
257. This was the approach taken by the Comptroller General in an unpublished
opinion subsequent to the Ammons case allowing the Government to withhold the
amount of its claim from the injured party's pay where he had received a settlement
or judgment which purportedly included the Government's claim. Comp. Gen. B-15093
(Jan. 26, 1966).
258. Baker, The Serviceman as a Tort Plaintiff, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 372, 390
(1971), in which the author claims that the Government can recover from the injured
party. To be on the safe side, the Government should probably file suit against both
the tortfeasor on its independent claim and the injured party on its subrogated right.
But cf. United States v. Ammons, 242 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1970). This right has been upheld in the federal courts
in Forrester v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1970) ; Phillips v. Trame,
252 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Ill. 1966); Murphy v. Smith, 243 F. Supp. 1006, 1008
(E.D.S.C. 1965). In the state courts, it has also been upheld. Heffernan v. Hertz
Corp., 34 App. Div. 2d 552, 309 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1970); Tolliver v. Shumate, 151
W. Va. 105, 150 S.E.2d 579 (1966). This right is clearly a matter of federal law and
should override any state procedural laws to the contrary. The states do not have to
furnish a forum for the federal government, but if they provide a forum, they are
controlled by the supremacy clause and must follow the federal statute. This is a
right of intervention not subject to the discretion of the trial judge. Heffernan v.
Hertz Corp., supra.
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institute suit on its own.260 The latter suit may be brought in the
name of the Government or the injured party, separately or in conjunction with the injured party.20 ' Thus, this section provides a
means for enforcing both the independent and the subrogated rights.
The independent right can be asserted through intervention or separate
suit, while the subrogated right can be enforced by a suit in the
name of the injured party for the benefit of the Government. However, these suits are directed by the United States Attorney. Because
of the lack of staff available in the enforement agencies and the
heavy case load of the various United States Attorneys, the Government has developed another collection technique" 2 requesting
counsel for the injured party to include an allegation in his suit claiming these damages for the benefit of the Government.263 Obviously,
the injured party cannot attempt to collect through the independent
right of the United States, so this procedure necessarily is based
upon the subrogated right.
A.

Collection Through Private Suit of the Injured Party

It is questionable whether this new technique is authorized. The
language of section 2651(b) does not seem to lend much support for
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1970). It was held in United States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Va. 1970), that the Government does not have
to join in the injured party's suit filed after the initial six-month period, but may
maintain a separate suit in its own name. The meaning of this six-month provision
has caused considerable controversy. See text accompanying notes 288-316 infra.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1970). This provision has raised some question as to
whether it provides an additional source of jurisdiction for the federal courts to hear
the injured party's claim. Normally, the injured party would have no access to the
federal courts unless there existed diversity of citizenship between the tortfeasor and
the injured party. In Becote v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 308 F. Supp.
1266 (D.S.C. 1970), the injured party sued for himself and for the benefit of the
United States. There was no diversity of citizenship since the defendant was a state
agency, but the plaintiff claimed jurisdiction under the language of section 2651(b).
The court dismissed the suit on the basis that the "conjunction" language does not
give federal jurisdiction to hear private suits. In Rogers v. Bates, 431 F.2d 16 (8th
Cir. 1970), the Government filed suit under the Act and the conservator for the
deceased veteran attempted to join. The trial court denied the joinder on the basis
of the lack of diversity of citizenship. On appeal, the conservator argued for the first
time that the Recovery Act allowed him to join in the Government's suit. The court
in a most unsatisfactory opinion rejected his claim. Finally, in Hipp v. United States,
313 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), the injured party sued the Government under
the Tort Claims Act. She did not sue the joint-tortfeasor because there was no
diversity jurisdiction. The United States cross-claimed against the joint tortfeasor
for contribution and for its medical costs under the Recovery Act. The court then
allowed the plaintiff to file suit against the impleaded joint tortfeasor. There is merit
in allowing the injured party to join in the Government's suit once it has been filed,
since it allows the entire matter to be settled in a single suit and, therefore, Rogers
should not be considered the final word in this area.
262. For a detailed discussion of this unofficial collection procedure and the problems it has caused, see Long, Administration of the Federal Medical Care Recovery
Act, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 253, 276-93 (1971).
263. See note 274 infra.
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it since it speaks in terms of instituting and prosecuting actions in
conjunction with the injured party. This language would seem simply
to authorize the United States to be a named party, working side-by-side
with the injured person. However, this section might be thought
to be inapplicable in such a case, since the United States is not enforcing any right; rather, the injured party is enforcing the Government's right on its behalf. Thus, the Recovery Act has merely created
an interest which a third party can enforce on the Government's behalf. This, as we have seen,264 was supplied when Congress created
both independent and subrogated rights. The Government should
be able to pursue its subrogated right as any other party pursues a
subrogated right under state law. This is the position taken by the
Department of Justice265 and supported by several commentators. 266
However, the cases which have considered the matter are divided,
The question was first raised in Carrington v. Vanlinder,. 7 in which
the court held that the Government did not have a separate subrogated
right, but, following the reasoning of the Fort Benning case,26 held
that the Government had but a single independent right which was
subrogated only in the limited sense that there had to be liability
on the part of the tortfeasor to the injured party under state law.
Since there was only the independent right, the injured party could
not enforce this for the Government. 26 9 The matter was again considered in Conley v. Maattala.270 The Conley court recognized that
the Government had three ways to enforce its rights under the
Recovery Act, one of which was subrogation. The court went on
to hold that which of these three methods the Government chose
to use was solely within its discretion and that the defendant could
not object if it elected to follow the subrogation route through the
injured party's suit. Subsequently, four other federal district courts
have followed this reasoning and have denied defendants' motions to
dismiss the plaintiffs' allegations on behalf of the United States.2 '
264. See text accompanying notes 87-123 supra.
265. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Suggested Procedures for Collection of Claims for
Value of Medical Care (Sept. 1, 1964).
266. Noone, supra note 115; Turner, supra note 89. But see Cassady, The Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act and Private Attorneys (Apr. 1968) (unpublished thesis
in the Judge Advocate General's School Library).
267. 58 Misc. 2d 80, 294 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
268. 387 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1967).
269. Cassady, supra note 266. Cassady based his conclusion on a letter (see id.
at 34 n.56) from the Chief of the Justice Department's Civil Division to the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy which indicated that three of the District of Columbia
district court judges had held that the United States would have to intervene. Apparently, this opinion was rendered informally in chambers and the reasoning of the
judges is not available.
270. 303 F. Supp. 484 (D.N.H. 1969).
271. Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
Palmer v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ; Marshall v.
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While the reasoning of neither Carrington nor Conley is entirely
satisfactory, it would seem that the Conley analysis is superior. Our
earlier analysis examined and rejected the concept that the Government has only one right which has certain subrogation characteristics.
Similarly, the concept that there was only one right which could be
procedurally enforced in a variety of different ways was also rejected.
There are in fact two separate rights, one independent and one subrogated. However, the Conley court was correct in recognizing that
the Government should be able to avail itself to the full extent of its
subrogated right. The critical difference is that the subrogated right
depends solely upon state procedure and state substantive law.
Therefore, the question shifts from whether or not collection
through the injured party is authorized by federal law to whether
the technique is available under state law. 2 In most states, the subrogor, in the case of a partial subrogation, is entitled to bring suit
upon the entire claim without joining the partial subrogee as a party
plaintiff, 27 3 the subrogee not being considered a real party in interest.27 4 There are a few states, notably Louisiana, 275 which require
that the subrogee bring suit in his own name. In those states, since
the United States cannot be forced to join under the state real
party-in-interest statutes,2 76 the plaintiff's allegation should be dismissed or recovery denied277 as was 277
done in two Louisiana cases. 278
Cuttrell, Civil No. 70-254 (W.D. Okla., Aug. 4, 1970); Kaplan v. Bella, Civil No.
68-229 (W.D. Tex., May 26, 1969). Albright held, however, that the plaintiff may
not include the amount of the Government's claim in calculating the amount in controversy necessary to establish the jurisdictional amount in diversity cases. 350 F.
Supp. at 350-51.
272. Turner, supra note 89.
273. See note 249 supra.
274. McWhirter v. Otis Elevator Co., 40 F. Supp. 11 (W.D.S.C. 1941), held that
the defendant can be sued by the real party in interest so that the judgment would
fully protect him against further suits. To avoid this problem, in some cases the
Government has specifically authorized plaintiff's lawyer, by letter filed with the
court, to include the allegation, indicating that the Government has agreed to be
bound by the outcome of the litigation. Palmer v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 343 F. Supp.
692 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ; Marshall v. Cuttrell, Civil No. 70-254 (W.D. Okla., Aug. 4,
1970) ; Conley v. Maattala, 303 F. Supp. 484 (D.N.H. 1969) ; Kaplan v. Bella, Civil
No. 68-229 (W.D. Tex., May 26, 1969). Having once consented to be bound by the
decision, the Government would be estopped from attempting to relitigate the matter.
Palmer v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., supra at 695.
275. 2 LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 697 (West 1960).
276. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941). See Bernzweig, Public
Law 87-693: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Federal Medical Care Recovery
Act, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 1257, 1270 n.82 (1964).
277. This result would not prevent the Government from then suing in its own
right on its independent cause of action, or from voluntarily intervening in the state
court proceedings.
278. Avery v. Smith, 216 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 1968), cert. denied, 253 La. 313,
217 So. 2d 410 (1969) ; Smith v. Foucha, 172 So. 2d 318 (La. App.), cert. denied,
247 La. 678, 173 So. 2d 542 (1965). Yet in Louisiana, the injured party's lawyer may
handle settlement negotiations for the Government up to the time of trial. See Irby
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 9 (La. App. 1965).
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Certain disadvantages which have not been fully appreciated
accompany this private device to recoup medical costs. Since the
injured party is suing on the Govenrment's subrogated right, the
recovery of these items is subject to all the state substantive defenses
outlined above.2 79 However, in an effort to let the Government
have its cake and eat it too, a number of commentators have attempted to claim that there is only one independent right and that
this right can be enforced through subrogation. 8 ° Furthermore, it is
claimed that the state substantive defenses do not apply to the Government's right because it is an independent right, merely procedurally
enforceable by subrogation. As we have seen, the Conley and Fort
Benning cases tend to support the first proposition. It is submitted,
however, that the Conley and Fort Benning interpretation of the Recovery Act is erroneous, and that, even if it were accepted, it should
not be extended to exclude substantive state defenses where the injured party sues for the benefit of the Government.281
B.

Collateral Estoppel

A second procedural problem is the effect of a judgment obtained
by either the injured party or the Government as res judicata in a suit
by the other. Three cases have considered the matter,282 and in all these
cases the injured party first brought suit for his injuries and received
a judgment. In United States v. Jones and United States v. Freese,
the courts stated, without discussion, the judgment in favor of the
injured party foreclosed further litigation of this point when the
Government sought to recover its claim in a separate suit. 283 United
States v. Stinnett,28 4 on the other hand, considered the same question
279. Turner, supra note 89.
280. See, e.g., Noone, supra note 115; Comment, supra note 106, at 130.
281. One commentator argues that where the injured party brings suit, the state
statute should govern. In certain instances this would be advantageous to the Government, since a few states have a longer tort statute than the three-year federal statute.
Turner, supra note 89, at 48. Turner bases his reasoning on the theory that the
subrogation provision in the Recovery Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity
as to the application of state statutes of limitations. He then concludes from the
legislative history that the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1970), does not apply
where an existing statute governs. As appealing as this approach is, it will not stand
close inspection. As we have seen (see text accompanying notes 210-30 supra), the
statute of limitations question has a peculiar history which indicates that the problem
has always been treated as a matter of federal law whenever a federal governmental
interest was involved. Against this background, the statement in the legislative
history about the new general statute not applying where an existing statute controlled
clearly refers to an existing federal statute of limitations.
282. United States v. Stinnett, 318 F. Supp. 1337 (W.D. Okla. 1970) ; United
States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967) ; United States v. Freese, Civil No.
66C69(2) (E.D. Mo., Dec. 30, 1966).
283. 264 F. Supp. 11, 13 (E.D. Va. 1967) ; Civil No. 66C69(2), at ____ (E.D.
Mo., Dec. 30, 1966).
284. 318 F. Supp. 337 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
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in detail, since it was the only issue raised. The earlier judgment involved therein was a consent judgment, the result of a court-approved
settlement. The Stinnett court first determined that the Recovery
Act gave the Government two separate rights, one independent and
the other subrogated, and then concluded with respect to this subrogated right that the United States was in privity with the injured
party. The court also believed that this privity prevented the tortfeasor from relitigating the question of liability.2 85
On the basis of Stinnett, it would seem valid to conclude that
when the Government sues on its subrogated right, because of the
privity between the Government and the injured party, the tortfeasor
will be barred from relitigating the question of liability.2"6 The only
issue which would remain in such cases would be the necessity and
reasonableness of the medical care.2" 7 Yet when the Government
brings suit on its independent right, it would seem that the same
privity would not be present, and the tortfeasor could relitigate the
question of liability.
285. Id. at 1338.
286. This conclusion is also supported by United States v. Freese, Civil No.
66C69(2) (E.D. Mo., Dec. 30, 1966), because the court there treated the Government's
right as solely one of subrogation. Both Stinnett and Freese leave one question
unanswered: when the Government seeks to enforce its subrogated right, must it
sue in the name of the injured party for the Government's benefit or can it sue in its
own name? In both cases the Government sued in its own name. Section 2651(b)
indicates that suit can be brought in either the Government's name or that of the
injured party, but it is not clear whether this means that it will be brought in the
Government's name when the independent right is pursued and in the injured party's
name when the subrogated right is pressed. This language is patterned after the
recovery provision in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 751
(1970), in which the right granted is only a subrogated one and the Government is
authorized to bring suit in its own name. Thus it would seem that the Government
under the Recovery Act can sue in either manner. It should, however, identify in
its pleading which right it is attempting to pursue.
287. The Government charges a flat per diem rate for hospital care it furnishes
regardless of the treatment provided. This rate is presently $61 per in-patient day
and $12 per visit to an out-patient facility. 36 Fed. Reg. 11327 (1971). The Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2652(a) (1970), gives the President the power to establish these rates.
By Executive Order, President Kennedy delegated this rate making authority to the
Bureau of the Budget. Exec. Order No. 11,060, 3 C.F.R. 651 (1963). It has been
held that since the rates are established under the authority delegated by Congress,
they are to be treated as a part of the statute, and are not subject to challenge.
United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Va. 1967); Tolliver v. Shumate,
151 W. Va. 105, 150 S.E.2d 579 (1966). However, the defendant tortfeasor may
challenge the reasonableness or necessity for the care. Id. The Jones court acknowledged that "servicemen are frequently kept in a hospital for a longer period than
necessary for the obvious reason that they cannot be returned to duty and it is not
appropriate to send them to their homes." 264 F. Supp. at 14. One insurer has
elaborated on this practice of retaining military patients beyond the medically required time. He indicated that one military hospital had divided its patients into five
separate categories, of which only one was definitely required to be retained for
medical reasons and two others were questionable. The remaining two categories
were retained for military, rather than medical, reasons. See Long, supra note 262,
at 291 n.284, citing Address of Edward S. Ring, Vice President, Government
Employees Insurance Co., NAIIA Convention, May, 1967.
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THE SIX-MONTH

PROVISION

The second major statutory interpretation question which the
courts have had to consider under the Recovery Act is what meaning
to assign to the six-month provision of section 2651(b). The language
in question reads:
The United States may, to enforce such right, (1) intervene or
join in any action or proceeding brought by the injured . . .
person . . . or (2) if such action or proceeding is not commenced
within six months after the first day in which care and treatment
is furnished by the United States . . . institute and prosecute
legal proceedings . . . either alone . . . or in conjunction with the
288
injured . . . person ....
The dispute revolves around whether the emphasized language is
a statute of limitations or merely a condition for the filing of a separate
action by the Government. The proponents of the statute of limitations position argue that the language means that if the injured party
files suit within the six-month period, then the Government must
join in that suit 289 or be barred from recovery by a subsequent independent suit after the six-month period has run. The net effect of
this position would be to limit the Government to joining in the
injured party's suit under these circumstances, since the language
clearly prevents the Government from filing an independent suit within
the first six months.
Opponents of the statute of limitations approach argue with
equal vigor that the emphasized language only requires the Government to delay filing an independent suit for six months - that the
injured party is simply given six months in which to decide whether
to settle or sue. If he does neither, there is no problem, since after
six months the Government clearly can sue. If, however, he files
within the six-month period, the opponents argue that the Government still has the option to join or go it alone by separate suit.
The question was initially raised in four suits before different
federal district courts. In three of these, United States v. Housing
Authority,29 ° United States v. York,29 1 and United States v. Mer288. 42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
289. It is conceded that the Government does not have to join within the sixmonth period, but may join later. See United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d
Cir. 1968). Likewise, it is conceded that the Government may join if the injured party
brought suit at a later date. Carrington v. Vanlinder, 58 Misc. 2d 80, 294 N.Y.S.2d
412 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
290. 276 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wash. 1967), rev'd, 415 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1969).
291. 261 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Tenn. 1966), reVd, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968).
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rigan,2 "2 the courts adopted the statute of limitations position.293 In
the fourth, United States v. Wittrock,2 94 such an interpretation was
rejected. On appeal, all three district courts favoring the statute of
limitations position were reversed. 29" The statute of limitations approach was rejected by yet another district court recently in United
290
States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp.
The reasoning of these district courts in adopting the statute of
limitations approach is not totally clear. It is apparent that both the
York and Housing Authority courts were concerned with the fact
that the defendant would be forced to litigate the question twice.297
Also, the York court expressed concern that the defendant might be
required to pay these same costs twice and, therefore, that the
Recovery Act should be strictly construed. 298 However, we have seen
that this conclusion is inaccurate, since the defendant tortfeasor can
avoid double payment by bringing the injured party in as a thirdparty defendant. 29 9 Finally, the Housing Authority court felt that its
conclusion was the only construction which would give effect to the
statutory language. 0 This reasoning completely ignores the contention that the sole purpose of the provision is to give the injured party
six months in which to bring his own suit first.
On appeal, all three courts adopted the idea suggested in United
States v. Wittrock,3°1 that the language of section 2651(b) is permissive only, merely providing that the United States may intervene
and may sue. Thus, they concluded that other enforcement procedures
were possible.30 2 The Merrigan court then went on to hold that "the
292. Civil No. 835-65 (D.N.J., March 1, 1967), rev'd, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968).
293. This position was also adopted in dicta in United States v. Bartholomew, 266

F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
294. 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
295. United States v. Housing Authority, 415 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1969); United
States v. York, 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968) ;United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21
(3d Cir. 1968).
296. 309 F.Supp. 1246 (W.D.Va. 1970).
297. See 415 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1969); 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968).
298. Such a strict construction would appear to be contrary to the holding in
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), that procedural provisions are not to be strictly construed against the Government, but rather in aid of the
statutory right created.
299. See text accompanying notes 251-52 supra.

300. 415 F.2d at 241.
301. 268 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967).

302. United States v. Housing Authority, 415 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1969)
United States v. York, 398 F.2d 582, 586 (6th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Merrigan,

389 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1968). In Merrigan, Judge Hastie dissented. He felt
that
the case was squarely within the provisions of section 2651(b) and that the majority

could not ignore this provision in favor of some other procedure not outlined in the
statute. He isnot opposed to governmental recovery in this situation, but merely
feels that Congress did not adequately provide for the contingency in drafting the
statute. See 389 F.2d at 26.
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six month provision is an incongruous residue left in the statute from
the earlier intention to provide to the government no more than a
derivative right of subrogation." ' 3 It finally concluded that the provision meant nothing more than that the Government could not begin
a separate suit for six months.
If the language of the statute is read strictly and without reference to its legislative history, it is difficult to avoid the conclusions
reached by the district courts and Judge Hastie, dissenting in Merrigan.
It would seem that the procedures outlined in section 2651(b) are not
intended to be mandatory, for we have seen that recovery through
the private suit of the injured party is authorized by the statute. °4
However, reference to a procedure outside the statute would not seem
to be proper because, as Judge Hastie pointed out, the statutory lan305
guage clearly covers the case.

The legislative history reveals that the Act originally provided
only a subrogated right. 306 The original language of section 2651(b)
provided that the subrogated right could be enforced by direct suit
or intervention. The comments of the Comptroller General on this
provision are instructive:
The first portion of this provision apparently would permit the
Government to take immediate action against the liable third
person without permitting the injured or diseased person an opportunity to settle the claim himself. It would appear to be to the
interest of both the Government and the injured or diseased person to permit that person to take the necessary action, with the
Government doing so only when the injured or diseased person
fails or refuses to do so within a reasonable time. . . . The committee may wish to consider the desirability of including in the
bill itself a provision reserving to the injured or diseased person
a specific period of time within which he may attempt to settle
a claim. A provision reserving such a specific period in cases
arising under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is contained in subsection 33(b) of that act .... 307
The original suggestion of the six-month delay provision was made
in contemplation of a subrogated recovery system where the normal
recovery procedure would be for the injured party to sue for the en-tire claim and reimburse the Government out of the proceeds. Under
303. 389 F.2d at 25.
304. See text accompanying notes 259-81 supra.
305. 389 F.2d at 25 (dissenting opinion).
306. See text accompanying notes 87-123 supra.
307. Letter from Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General of the United States, to
Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Aug. 2, 1961, in
S. REP. No. 1945, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (Appendix).
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these circumstances, the Government would only sue when the injured party failed or refused to sue.
The congressional intent is made even clearer upon examination
of the language of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act referred to by the Comptroller General:
Acceptance of such compensation [as provided by the Act] . . .
shall operate as an assignment to the employer of all right[s]
of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against
such third person unless such person shall commence an action
against such third person within six months after such award."°8
Under this section, if the injured longshoreman files suit within the
six-month period, the compensation carrier is subrogated to the amount
of the compensation paid." °9 If no suit is filed, the employer or his
compensation carrier is entitled to bring suit for the entire claim
(both the injured party's and its own), deduct expenses of suit, compensation paid, other benefits furnished, plus one-fifth of the excess,
and pay over the remainder, if any, to the injured party. 1 '
It is submitted that Congress subsequently decided to shift the
emphasis in the recovery program from a subrogated system, where
the injured party would carry the brunt of the recovery responsibility
as under the Longshoremen's Act, to an independent right system.
The Act left as a secondary recovery system the original subrogation
provision, but did not include any requirement that the injured party's
suit include the interest of the Government. As a result, it has been
held that the Government could not force him to include its claim.3" '
Thus, the primary reason suggested by the Comptroller General for
including the delaying period disappeared.
Congress was, however, definitely concerned about the effect upon
the injured party of the Government's attempts to recover. 12 As a
result, it is submitted that Congress decided to include the delay
period, as suggested by the Comptroller General, merely to give the
injured party a chance to settle his portion of the injury claim with308. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
309. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1961).
310. 33 U.S.C. § 933(e) (1970).
311. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Va. 1967).
312. See 42 U.S.C. § 2652(c) (1970) which reads:
No action taken by the United States in connection with the rights afforded under
this legislation shall operate to deny to the injured person the recovery for that
portion of his damages not covered hereunder.
That the Government's intervention in the injured party's private suit could
be detrimental was recognized in Conley v. Maattala, 303 F. Supp. 484 (D.N.H.
1969), and used as one of the reasons for allowing the injured party to include
allegations recovering these costs for the benefit of the Government.
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out any adverse influence from the Government. Unfortunately, the
drafters used the Longshoremen's Act as a model for their revision
(as had been suggested by the Comptroller General) apparently not
realizing the change in the nature of the Government's rights under
the program. To reflect their intent of merely delaying initial action
by the Government, the provision should have been worded:
The United States may, to enforce such right, (1) intervene ...
or (2) after six months from the first day in which care and
treatment is furnished by the United States . . . institute and

prosecute legal proceedings ....
In light of the fact that Congress never intended to prevent the
Government from suing on its independent right, but merely to delay
suit for six months, it is unclear what the courts should do. Judge
Hastie would have them do nothing, on the ground that the courts
cannot remedy the situation through judicial construction:
Congress specified the remedies it created in a way that excludes
an independent action by the United States in this situation. Therefore, I think it is not within judicial competence to grant such a
remedy, however desirable that course of action may seem. 13
On the contrary, it is submitted that the court has a positive duty
to interpret the statute in a way that will carry out the congressional
intent. It has long been recognized that the courts are not to give a
literal, but absurd, interpretation to a statute.3 14 The duty of the court
to interpret the statute in accordance with congressional intent rather
than to give merely a literal reading to the statutory language was
summarized in Los Angeles Mailers Union v. NLRB : '5
We may give language in a statute, if it will reasonably bear
such a construction, the meaning Congress intends, though read
literally it would bear a different meaning. The courts are under
an obligation at times
to do this in order to give legislation its
3 16
proper application.

Applying this rule of construction to the Recovery Act, it seems inescapable that section 2651(b) was not intended as a partial statute of
limitations and should be interpreted as simply delaying the right of the
Government to bring an independent action for a period of six months.
313. United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d 21, 27 (3d Cir. 1968) (Hastie, J.,
dissenting).
314. United States v. Braverman, 373 U.S. 405 (1963); United States v. Ryan,
284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931).
315. 311 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
316. Id. at 124, citing Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962).
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CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has indicated that the courts have had
a rather extensive and difficult task interstitially interpreting the
Recovery Act. By and large, they have performed well. However,
the courts have often decided the particular controversies before them
without a great deal of thought as to the effect of their decisions on
the body of jurisprudence involved. As a result, the group of decisions
concerning the Recovery Act has tended to grow like Topsy, uncontrolled and undisciplined, with a number of contradictory and partially
conflicting decisions. It has been the purpose of this Article to attempt
to shape these into a consistent and symmetrical body of law which
will correctly reflect the purpose of the Recovery Act and the policies
behind the creation of federal common law.
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